“The Most Available Presidential Candidate for Unadulterated Republicans”:
The Chicago Convention (May 1860)

In May 1859, Lincoln’s friend Nathan M. Knapp prophetically called him “the most available” (i.e., the most electable) presidential candidate “for unadulterated Republicans.”¹ A year later, that view had become so widespread that the Rail-splitter was able to capture the Republican nomination, for of all the outspoken critics of slavery, he seemed the one most likely to win.

UNDERMINING SEWARD

Delegates began arriving in Chicago well before May 16, the official opening day of the Republican convention. They were something to behold. The journalist Simon P. Hanscom remarked that of all the sights in the world, “the small politician at a National Convention is the most entertaining.” Dressed “in solemn black, he stalks gloomily along, as if the fate of the nation rested on his shoulders. He affects the diplomatic, and pretends to be acquainted with the sundry terrible schemes which are hatching.” The city “is a wonder to a stranger,” with “its broad avenues, magnificent buildings, splendid shops, and fine private residences.” There one could observe “all the good and the bad in

¹ Nathan M. Knapp to O. M. Hatch, Winchester, Illinois, 12 May 1859, Hatch Papers, Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield.
our national character,” all “our headlong haste to be rich – all our contempt of old forms and ceremonies – all our ridiculous parvenu affectation – all our real energy, enterprise and perseverance, opposed to which no difficulties are insurmountable – . . . all of the idiosyncrasies of Young America may be summed up in the single word Chicago.”

On May 12, Lincoln’s operatives gathered in the Windy City, where they had failed to secure hotel rooms ahead of time, so little did they think of their man’s chances. After persuading some families to give up their rooms in the Tremont House, they established headquarters there. Judge David Davis took command, ably assisted by attorneys from the Eighth Circuit, including Leonard Swett, Stephen T. Logan, Ward Hill Lamon, Samuel C. Parks, Clifton H. Moore, Lawrence Weldon, and Oliver Davis; by Lincoln’s friends like Jesse W. Fell, Ozius M. Hatch, Ebenezer Peck, Richard J. Oglesby, Jackson Grimshaw, Nathan M. Knapp, Jesse K. Dubois, William Butler, John M. Palmer, Theodore Canisius, and Mark W. Delahay; and by Illinois delegates, notably Norman B. Judd, Gustave Koerner, Burton C. Cook, Richard Yates, and Orville H. Browning.

“If you will put yourself at my disposal day and night,” Davis told them, “I believe Lincoln can be nominated.” The judge dispatched these troops in squads of two or three to lobby delegations. “No one ever thought of questioning Davis’ right to send men hither and thither, nor to question his judgment,” recalled Swett, who described the

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4 Leonard Swett to the editor, Chicago, 13 July, Chicago Tribune, 14 July 1878.
judge as “the most thorough manager of men I ever knew,” “a born ruler,” “a teacher of teachers, a man among men, a master of masters,” one who “never faltered, never gave up, never made any mistakes.”

Their strategy was simple: first, stop Seward; then line up about 100 delegates for Lincoln on the first ballot (233 were necessary to win); then make sure that he gained more votes on the second ballot in order to create momentum; finally, capture the nomination on the third ballot. It was important not to get out front too early, lest other candidates combine to stop him.

To realize this plan, Davis assigned handlers to work tactfully with the delegates, meeting them upon their arrival, escorting them either to their lodgings, and making sure that all their needs were met. They engaged in no hard salesmanship but rather urged their charges to consider making Lincoln their second choice, if not their first, and impressed upon them that Seward, unlike Lincoln, could not carry the four swing states -- Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. (At the convention, the Chicago Press and Tribune included two others in that category: Connecticut and Rhode Island.) Many delegates not pledged to Seward were cared for in this way. On May 14, Lincoln’s operatives informed him that they were “dealing tenderly with delegates, taking them in detail,” “making no fuss,” “not pressing too hard your Claims,” and winning “friends

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7 Chicago Press and Tribune, 16 May 1860. Amos Tuck, a delegate to the Chicago convention, reported that Connecticut was considered a state that Seward could not carry. Amos Tuck to Benjamin Brown French, Boston, 26 May 1860, French Family Papers, Library of Congress.
8 Norman B. Judd’s son Edward, recalling a story he heard his father tell many times, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 6 February 1916.
every where.” To delegates not committed to Seward they quietly argued that most
westerners thought the Republicans would surely lose Indiana, Illinois, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania – and thus the national election – with Chase or Seward as their standard
bearer. Among them were Bates supporters, led by Horace Greeley, who was serving
both as a delegate from Oregon and as a Bates manager. A few days after the
convention, Swett reported: “We let Greeley run his Bates machine, but got most of them
for a second choice.”

Friends of Lincoln were urged “to go about and talk about him – to tell of his
romantic life, his humble birth, his rail-splitting and flat-boating, his fine character and
his great ability.” They were to commend Seward “in the highest terms,” while pointing
out that “to nominate him meant defeat in the election.” Charles H. Ray told a pr-Chase
delegate from Massachusetts: “We must win to extend ourselves into the border slave
states, and to have in our hands the power to fill the places of the four judges of the
Supreme Court who will die . . . before the next Presidential term expires. We can win
with Lincoln, with Judge [John M.] Read, possibly with [William L.] Dayton or [Jacob]
Collamer; but not with Seward.” To be sure, Ray conceded, the New Yorker “has earned
and now deserves the place.” But, he asked rhetorically, “why on a point of gratitude,
throw away a victory now within our grasp?” Of the four electable men he listed,

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9 Nathan M. Knapp to Lincoln, Chicago, 14 May 1860, and Mark Delahay to Lincoln, Chicago, 14 May
1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

10 Horace Greeley, “Last Week at Chicago,” New York Tribune, 22 May 1860; Jeter Allen Isely, Horace

York Sun, 26 July 1891.

“Lincoln is the best,” Ray maintained, for he was “intensely radical on fundamental principles” but had “never said an intemperate word,” was sound on the tariff and homestead legislation, supported sensible internal improvements, was “a Southern man by birth and education,” a “peoples man,” and “as true and as honest a man as ever lived.” Nothing more could be asked of a candidate. “Why not go for him and make victory certain? Depend upon it, . . . we have no votes to throw away. We shall want every man.” If Seward must be passed over, so be it.13

The only serious objection to Lincoln raised by some delegates was “that his record is as unfortunate [i.e., as radical] as Seward’s.”14 To combat that impression, Lincoln notified his supporters: “I agree with Seward in his ‘Irrepressible Conflict,’ but I do not endorse his ‘Higher Law’ doctrine.”15

Davis and his allies worked doggedly to stop the Seward bandwagon. The challenge was daunting, for as Ray noted, the New York senator had long been regarded as the leader of the party, richly deserving the nomination for his many contributions to the cause. He himself thought the nomination was his due.16 His operatives, led by the shrewd, calculating Thurlow Weed, known variously as “the wizard of the lobby,” “Lord Thurlow,” “the Richelieu of his party,” and “the Dictator,” smugly anticipated an early


14 Chicago correspondence, 14 May, Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), 15 May 1860, copied in the Illinois State Register (Springfield), 16 May 1860.


victory. They “went to Chicago with the joy, pride and self confidence of a bridegroom marching to his wedding feast.” Upon arrival they were “clamorous as crows.” A supporter of N. P. Banks at the convention noted that Weed’s “motions are as rapid as a rope-dancer’s; his eye heretofore dull lights up with an expression both powerful and charming; he speaks quick and short and always in a low tone, smiling you into acquiescence, and looking you into conviction with his sincerity; he calls with his finger, and changes proceedings with a word. Marvelous is his power over man – indescribable it is felt, not seen; you act upon his convictions, not your own, and know not when or how the substitution was made.”

Flush with money, accompanied by bands and celebrities (like the prizefighter Tom Hyer, whose presence caused some wags to jest about Seward’s Hyer law doctrine), Weed and his allies sought to lend an air of inevitability to their candidate’s nomination.

Some Seward backers were imposingly sophisticated. “The New York men were more cultured and scholarly than we,” recalled one Illinoisan. “They were better and more appropriately dressed for such an occasion. They wore their neat business suits, to which they were accustomed; while we, especially those of us who were from the country, were dressed in our ‘Sunday clothes,’ to which we were not accustomed.”

Other New Yorkers were more brash; the Cincinnati journalist Murat Halstead noted that they “can drink as much whiskey, swear as loud and long, sing as bad songs, and ‘get up

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18 New York Herald, 22 May 1860.
19 Montgomery Blair to his wife, Chicago, 11 May 1860, Blair Family Papers, Library of Congress.
21 Carr, The Illini, 271.
and howl’ as ferociously as any crowd of Democrats. They are opposed as they say to being ‘too d---d virtuous.’ . . . They slap each other on the back with the emphasis of delight when they meet, and rip out ‘How are you?’ with a ‘How are you hoss?’ style, that would do honor to Old Kaintuck on a bust.”

Another journalist reported that the “friends of Seward are very defiant. They demand his nomination upon the ground that he is the representative of the republican party, as Douglas is the representative of the democratic party, and some of them threaten to bolt if he is not put forward as the republican candidate for the Presidency.”

They had little use for Lincoln; Weed’s assistant editor on the Albany Evening Journal acknowledged that the friends of Seward “labored earnestly to prevent his [Lincoln’s] nomination,” for they “deemed him greatly the inferior, in every way, of their candidate. And they said so, kindly but with emphasis.”

The result of this pressure was that opponents of Seward were “hard pressed, sorely perplexed, and despondent” as the convention began.

The prospect of Seward’s candidacy did not sit well with everyone. It was widely feared that moderate and conservative Republicans in the Lower North would desert and vote for John Bell, nominee of the newly-formed Constitutional Union Party (composed mainly of conservative ex-Whigs) if Seward, with his radical antislavery reputation, were to become the party’s standard bearer. Conversely, some strong antislavery men were disenchanted with Seward’s February 29 speech, in which he referred to the Slave States

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22 Chicago correspondence, 17 May, Cincinnati Commercial, 19 and 21 May 1860.
25 Chicago correspondence, 17 May, Cincinnati Commercial, 19 and 21 May 1860.
as “capital states” and the Free States as “labor states.” That address was too timid for one critic, who was reminded of the modest Indiana maiden who “wouldn’t swing in the garden any more ’kase ’taters had eyes!” Antislavery militants deemed Seward’s speech “utterly unsatisfactory” because it “created the impression that he was receding from his former positions.”

A New Hampshireman asked: “Did Seward aim to appease the South by the obsequious use of new terms? It struck me so. I think he is over-anxious to be President, and may have to ‘wait for the wagon,’ though his consummate abilities are everywhere acknowledged.”

Lydia Maria Child warned a fellow abolitionist: “Beware how you endorse William H. Seward. He is no more to be trusted than Daniel Webster was. He is thoroughly unprincipled and selfish.”

Seward’s February 29 speech so alienated some of his enthusiasts in northern Illinois that they said they would be just as happy with Lincoln. Their disenchantment with such Republican attempts to mollify Southerners was colorfully expressed by Herndon, who said they made him “ashamed that I am a Republican. I am like the little

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27 Russell Hinckley to his brother, Belleville, 28 March 1860, Lyman Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress.


29 Oliver Pillsbury to Mason W. Tappan, Henniker, 16 April 1860, Mason Tappan Papers, New Hampshire Historical Society.


girl who accidentally shot off wind in company – she said ‘I wish I was in “hell” a little while.’”

Seward faced other objections. Some critics complained that he belonged to “the New York school of very expensive rulers” and that his “uniform votes for lavish expenditures” might “embarrass the argument against the extravagance if not the corruption of Pierce and Buchanan.” In the view of George G. Fogg, Seward had “always distinguished himself by his willingness to squander the public moneys on any and every scheme of private emolument with which Congress has been approached.”

The New York *Evening Post* observed: “Not a rogue comes to Washington with a plausible device for spending the money obtained from the people . . . who does not find a friend and champion in Senator Seward.”

Nativists disliked Seward’s action as governor of New York twenty years earlier, when he recommended granting state money to Catholic schools. At Chicago, Thaddeus Stevens, a leading Pennsylvanian who championed the candidacy of John McLean, intoned repeatedly: “Pennsylvania will never vote for the man who favored the destruction of the common-school system in New York to gain the favor of Catholics and

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32 Herndon to Theodore Parker, Springfield, 15 December 1859, Herndon-Parker Papers, University of Iowa.


foreigners.”37 From Philadelphia came a warning that nativists “have engendered so
thorough a prejudice against him [Seward], that a life-time [of] apologies and
explanations of his acts and connexion with Bishop Hughes, of New York, and his
favoring a division of the ‘Public School fund with the Catholics’ could not induce them
to vote for him, and I am satisfied from what I can learn from the Eastern part of
Pennsylvania, that it would be suicidal to nominate him for the Presidency.” Nativists
would prefer Bates or McLean, but “will not object to Fessenden, or Lincoln, or
Dayton.”38 An Illinoisan at the convention reported that the “Americans or old Fillmore
men were all opposed to Seward because, it is believed that if he does not work hard to
get Catholic votes now, he once did.”39 In Louisville, a German businessman insisted that
“the German Protestant vote can be given to Seward under no circumstances.”40

Republicans also shied away from Seward because they hoped to capitalize on
fresh revelations of corruption in the Buchanan administration, as documented by
Congressman John Covode’s investigating committee and by the press.41 Shortly after the
convention, a delegate explained that the party would “have lost much, if not all the

that the school issue was the most decisive factor in Seward’s defeat. Alexander K. McClure, Abraham
Lincoln and Men of War-Times
183-98.
38 E. G. Waterhouse to William P. Fessenden, Philadelphia, 18 April 1860, Fessenden Papers, Western
Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland.
39 William Gooding to William H. Swift, Lockport, Illinois, 11 June 1860, typed copy of an extract,
Lincoln Collection, Chicago History Museum.
40 Quoted in William D. Gallagher to Salmon P. Chase, Pense Valley, Kentucky, 10 May 1860, Chase
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
41 “Frank” to Thurlow Weed, Washington, 4 April 1860, Weed Papers, University of Rochester; Summers,
Plundering Generation, 273-74; David E. Meere, “Buchanan, Corruption, and the Election of 1860,” Civil
War History 12 (1966): 116-31; David E. Meere, “Buchanan, the Patronage, and the Lecompton
capital we have in this campaign in the extravagance and corruption of the [Buchanan] Administration, had Seward been our candidate. However honest and pure Seward may be, he is not a political economist and there is a general distrust in the Northwest of that class of N.Y. politicians into whose hands Seward, in case of his election, would in his magnanimity to his friends, have placed our P.O. and custom houses.”

The chief engineer of the Illinois and Michigan canal noted that “a large number of influential Republicans in all the States opposed nominating Seward because his leading friends in his own State were believed to be awfully corrupt.” (Earlier that year, Weed had arranged for the passage of monopolistic legislation by the New York state legislature offering street-railway builders sweetheart franchises to construct trolley lines in New York City. The contractors in turn provided kickbacks which Weed planned to use in securing Seward’s nomination and election.)

The Sewardites’ haughtiness and braggadocio offended many delegates, one of whom protested that “the New Yorkers were there with money to corrupt, with bullies to intimidate and with houries to seduce.” (The previous year, Simon P. Hanscom had noted that there was “a threatening, bullying disposition, on the part of the Seward men . . . which will do their favorite no sort of good.”) On May 15, it was reported that

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45 Henry P. Scholte to Seward, Cincinnati, 19 May 1860, Seward Papers, University of Rochester.

46 Simon P. Hanscom to N. P. Banks, 7 January 1859, Banks Papers, Library of Congress.
Sewardites “have plenty of money and are using it freely” and that the “rumor that money has been freely used to bring about the success of Seward has greatly damaged his prospects.”\textsuperscript{47} New York operatives asked delegates: “If you don’t nominate Seward, where will you get your money?”\textsuperscript{48} (Vote-buying was common in that era. Democrats reportedly paid $15 per vote in New Hampshire, and a Republican leader confided that his party carried Delaware in 1861 with purchased votes.)\textsuperscript{49} William Maxwell Evarts, a leading Wall Street lawyer and one of the most eloquent supporters of the Sage of Auburn, assured delegates that Seward could win because his friends in New York would freely spend money to elect their man in the key battleground state of Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{50}

Such tactics backfired. According to Joshua Giddings, Seward’s operatives “disgusted members by their constant assertions that they had the money to win his election, that they could buy up the doubtful states.”\textsuperscript{51} A month after the convention a Boston journalist confided to a friend that “I was a Seward man and am now but . . . . . I do not like Governor Seward[’]s Albany friends. I believe them corrupt and I further believe that it was the fear that the Albany Regency with Weed at its head, and some tool


\textsuperscript{49} J. D. Moulton to John P. Hale, Ossipee Centre, New Hampshire, 22 February 1864, Hale Papers, New Hampshire Historical Society.


of his at its tail would be the power behind the throne that really defeated Seward.”  

In February, William Cullen Bryant had predicted that if Seward were elected, within one year “every honest [former] democrat of the Republican party” would be “driven into the opposition.” In New York there “are bitter execrations of Weed and his friends passing from mouth to mouth among the old radical democrats,” Bryant reported; “I suppose Weed never behaved worse than now – and his conduct alarms the best men here – they think it an omen of what we may expect from Seward’s administration.” Another New Yorker warned that the Republican party would be ruined if Seward were the nominee, for the electorate would not abide the “horde of political pirates and plunderers” who “attend upon Seward,” who was “embarrassed by his obligations to them and complicities with them.” Wall Street lawyer and moderate Republican George Templeton Strong dreaded the prospect of a victory by Seward and Weed, “the most adroit of wire-pullers,” with “their tail of profligate lobby men promoted from Albany to Washington.” An Iowa delegate recalled that among “the influential considerations in making many of us fight Seward so hard at Chicago was the feeling that the forces of ‘commercialism’ and corrupt political rule would triumph by his election.” New Yorkers “‘talked big’ about the need of money in the approaching election and the sources they would control and tap. It was notorious at that time that Weed manipulated the Albany

52 William Schouler to Israel Washburn, Boston, 14 June 1860, Washburn Family Papers, Washburn Memorial Library, Norlands, Maine. Seward had been warned that this might happen. Henry Henion to Seward, Seneca Falls, N.Y., 20 March 1860, Weed Papers, University of Rochester.
54 Hiram Barney to Salmon P. Chase, New York, 3 April 1860, Chase Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
legislature to secure New York City franchises for coteries or cliques of his personal and political friends. He was regarded as the most potent political manager in the country. . . . One of the New Yorkers came up to me and said, ‘It is absurd for you westerners to want to nominate an Illinois man or any other man than Seward. No man can carry Pennsylvania or Indiana unless he and his backers have plenty of the sinews of war.’ I asked, ‘What do you mean?’ ‘I mean money, of course,’ he rejoined. ‘Just so,’ I retorted, ‘and that is one of the reasons why we from Iowa and the West are afraid of you and are fighting you. You and your kind think you can purchase the election as you buy stocks. But you can’t buy Iowa. We need a little money for ordinary campaign expenses but not to buy votes. . . . Mr. Seward must not be nominated. Not because we think he is personally bad or wants to do anything unrighteous, but because he could not control the forces that are back of him and that would work through him.’”

Connecticut Senator James Dixon, who liked Seward personally, regretted that he was “surrounded by a corrupt set of rascals” and feared that “his administration would be the most corrupt the country has ever witnessed.” Even such an enthusiastic Seward supporter as Carl Schurz was dismayed when he beheld Weed, a “tall man with his cold, impassive face, giving directions to a lot of henchmen, the looks and the talk and the demeanor of many of whom made me feel exceedingly uncomfortable.” Many delegates thought Weed “the devil incarnate” and “the most corrupt and dangerous

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56 Charles C. Nourse, a delegate from Iowa, interviewed by Frank I. Herriot, Des Moines, 26 April and 12 May 1907, in Herriot, “Memories of the Chicago Convention,” 463.
It was perhaps unfair to hold Seward responsible for the corrupt city railroad franchises negotiated by Weed, but they tainted the senator in the eyes of many nonetheless. William Curtis Noyes, a Seward organizer at Chicago, lamented: “We could not resist the charges made against the last Legislature on the score of corruption, etc., and it was mainly imputed to his [Seward’s] friends; at all events, they were considered guilty, because, having the power to prevent it, they omitted to do so.” With much justice a Seward admirer from upstate New York concluded that “Mr Seward[’]s friends killed him and not his opponents.” George G. Fogg thought that Seward “won’t steal, but he don’t care how much his friends steal.” James Shepherd Pike told Senator William P. Fessenden that Seward’s votes in the senate formed “part of the hateful plundering policy that mocks & degrades New York politics & which is poisoning those of the federal gov[ernmen]t. We have got to make war on that policy & slay it or it will be the death of the republican party and perhaps the government itself. I never knew the

59 Chicago correspondence by Samuel Bowles, 16 May, Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican, 19 May 1860; Chicago correspondence, 30 May, New York Herald, 19 June 1860.
time when Seward did not vote on the stealing side. It seems as though it was our luck to be cursed with leading men having one damned rascally weakness or another. If he will vote with the thieving party it is deeply to be lamented for we all wish otherwise."

The only candidate lacking a “damned rascally weakness” was Lincoln, whose reputation as “Honest Old Abe” played a key role in his eventual nomination and election.

Further alienating delegates was the haughty manner of Seward’s operatives. They “assume an air of dictation which is at once unwarranted & offensive, & which I think will create a reaction,” reported James G. Blaine on May 16. The Seward forces tried to derail Lincoln’s candidacy by championing him for vice-president. On May 15, William Butler was approached by a Mr. Street of New York, along with Senator Preston King, a confidant of Thurlow Weed. Street pledged that if the Illinois delegation would agree to have Lincoln named as Seward’s running mate, they would receive $100,000 for both the Illinois and Indiana campaigns. When David Davis learned that a similar offer was being made to New Jersey men if Dayton would run on a ticket with Seward, he became “greatly agitated” and along with John M. Palmer paid a visit to the Garden State delegation. There “a grave and venerable judge” was “insisting that Lincoln shall be nominated for Vice-President – and Seward for President.” Palmer and Davis called on the judge, who “praised Seward, but he was especially effusive in expressing his admiration for Lincoln. He thought that Seward was clearly entitled to the first place, and that Lincoln’s eminent merits entitled him to second place.” After listening for some time, Palmer said: “you may nominate Mr. Lincoln for Vice-President if you please; but I

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67 Butler to Lincoln, Chicago, 4 p.m., 15 May 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.
want you to understand that there are forty thousand Democrats in Illinois who will support this ticket if you will give them an opportunity; but we are not Whigs, and we never expect to be Whigs. We will never consent to support two old Whigs on this ticket. We are willing to vote for Mr. Lincoln with a Democrat on the ticket; but we will not consent to vote for two old Whigs.”

The judge indignantly asked Davis: “is it possible that party spirit so prevails in Illinois that Judge Palmer properly represents public opinion?”

“Oh,” said Davis, feigning distress at Palmer’s remarks, “oh, my God, Judge, you can’t account for the conduct of these old Locofocos.”

“Will they do as Palmer says?”

“‘Certainly. There are forty thousand of them, and, as Palmer says, not a damned one of them will vote for two Whigs.’”

When Palmer and Davis left, the New Jersey judge was “in a towering rage.”

Upon returning to the Tremont House, Palmer complained: “Davis, you are an infernal rascal to sit there and hear that man berate me as he did. You really seemed to encourage him.”

Davis offered no reply, “but chuckled as if he had greatly enjoyed the joke.”

The most potent stop-Seward activists were in the Indiana and Pennsylvania delegations. Their gubernatorial candidates (Henry S. Lane and Andrew G. Curtin, respectively) protested that if Seward were nominated, they would lose. The eloquent Lane, a “thin, angular man, as quick as a cat, and with a voice like a trumpet,” mounted a

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69 Reminiscences of Curtin in Washington correspondence by Frank G. Carpenter, 18 December, Cleveland Leader, 23 December 1883; McClure, Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 30-37.
table at Tremont House, swung a cane about his head, and threatened to withdraw his candidacy if Seward became the standard bearer.70 The modest, unassuming Hoosier leader had spurned an offer of financial assistance from Weed. Mrs. Lane, who accompanied her husband to Chicago, wrote that the New York boss “took Mr. Lane out one evening and pleaded with him to lead the Indiana delegation over to Seward, saying they would send enough money from New York to ensure his election for Governor, and carry the State later for the New York candidate.” Lane “indignantly rejected” the proposal, insisting that “there was neither money nor influence enough” to induce him to change his mind.”71

Curtin’s efforts were equally effective, for he was, as Simon Hanscom put it, “a man of persuasive and irresistible eloquence in conversation.” He and Lane, said Hanscom, “did most to defeat Seward.”72 Horace Greeley told a friend: “If you had seen the Pennsylvania delegation, and known how much money Weed had in hand, you would not have believed we could do so well as we did. Give Curtin thanks for that.”73

Complicating Davis’s task was the ever-troublesome John Wentworth. On the eve of the convention his Chicago paper endorsed Seward.74 In addition, Long John lobbied key delegations on behalf of anyone but Lincoln. Evidently he aspired to a cabinet post,

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70 Chicago correspondence by Simon Hanscom, 11 May, New York Herald, 16 May 1860; Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
72 Chicago correspondence by Simon Hanscom, 30 May, New York Herald, 19 June 1860.
73 Greeley to James Shepherd Pike, New York, 21 May 1860, Pike Papers, University of Maine.
which would be unattainable if a fellow Illinoisan became president.\textsuperscript{75} To counteract his efforts, Lincoln operatives “detailed a man to follow him around and denounce him.”\textsuperscript{76}

WINNING INDIANA

After helping to slow the Seward bandwagon, David Davis and his coterie turned their attention to the Indiana delegation, which at first seemed divided between Bates and McLean supporters, though one Hoosier politico thought Cassius M. Clay would have “about as many friends as any of the candidates for President” in Indiana.\textsuperscript{77} Strengthening Lincoln’s chances was his personal acquaintance with some Indiana delegates whom he knew from his circuit court practice in Illinois counties bordering the Hoosier State.\textsuperscript{78} Two such delegates were George K. Steele, who had visited Lincoln in the early spring and found him impressive, and Greencastle attorney Dillard C. Donnohue, who had no desire “to go to Chicago for the purpose of putting in nomination a man just for the fun of seeing him defeated.”\textsuperscript{79} Fearful of bucking the strong Bates tide in his part of the state, Steele, along with Donnohue, conferred with Lane; the three men thought it best to divide

\textsuperscript{75} Chicago correspondence, 6 August, New York \textit{Herald}, 14 August 1860.

\textsuperscript{76} John M. Palmer, interviewed by J. McCan Davis, undated typescript, Ida Tarbell Papers, Allegheny College.


\textsuperscript{78} Adlai E. Stevenson, quoted in Frederick Trevor Hill, \textit{Lincoln the Lawyer} (New York: Century, 1906), 285-86.

\textsuperscript{79} Dillard C. Donnohue to Daniel D. Pratt, Greencastle, Indiana, 31 March 1860, Pratt Papers, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis. Donnohue, who served as mayor of Greencastle, was “an old Kentuckian, an adroit, urbane gentleman.” Washington correspondence by R. M. H., 12 February, Indianapolis \textit{Journal}, 18 February 1862.
the delegation evenly between Bates and Lincoln.⁸⁰ That represented an important first step in eroding the Missourian’s support in the Hoosier ranks.⁸¹

Shortly before the convention, Caleb B. Smith, who headed the Indiana delegation, asked some of his colleagues about Bates’s chances.⁸² Citing his unpopularity among the Germans of Cincinnati, R. M. Moore replied that Bates stood no chance of winning but that Lincoln did.⁸³ Others felt that Lincoln would run as well as Bates in Indiana and better than Bates in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and New Jersey.⁸⁴ Some Hoosier leaders, like John D. Defrees, ostensibly supported Bates but thought of “bringing forward a man who has more ‘running pints’ (as old Truman Smith says).”⁸⁵ In March, an Indiana congressman suggested that Lincoln could “by some exertion be nominated.”⁸⁶ While the delegation could not agree on a first choice, everyone supported Lincoln as their second choice.⁸⁷

Two other delegates from western Indiana, James C. Veatch, chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the State House of Representatives, and Cyrus M. Allen, the

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⁸⁰ Jesse W. Weik, “Indiana at 1860 G. O. P. Convention in Chicago,” undated clipping from the Indianapolis Sunday Star, [1924?], Lincoln Museum, Fort Wayne, Indiana. In September, Lincoln told a journalist that the Indiana delegation had “met about a month before the Convention, and in private conclave decided to do what they could” on his behalf. Springfield correspondence, 4 September, New York Evening Post, 8 September 1860.


⁸² Smith to Russell Errett, Indianapolis, 30 April 1860, Simon Cameron Papers, Library of Congress.


⁸⁴ A. Wheeler to Schuyler Colfax, South Bend, 4 March 1860, Colfax Papers, Indiana University.

⁸⁵ John D. Defrees to Henry S. Lane, Washington, 19 January 1860, Lane Papers, Indiana University.

⁸⁶ James Wilson to Henry S. Lane, Washington, 11 March 1860, Lane Papers, Indiana University.

⁸⁷ A. Wheeler to Schuyler Colfax, South Bend, 4 March 1860, Colfax Papers, Indiana University.
speaker of that body, helped persuade the rest of the delegation to back Lincoln. Veatch enjoyed a reputation for honesty and efficiency in a corrupt state government.88 When in late April, Allen asked Lincoln who would be representing his interests at Chicago, he replied: “Our friend Dubois, and Judge David Davis, of Bloomington, one or both, will meet you at Chicago on the 12th. If you let [John Palmer] Usher & [William D.] Griswold of Terre-Haute know, I think they will co-operate with you.”89 Dubois was from the Illinois county across the river from Vincennes, where Allen resided. A week before the convention, Allen predicted that Lincoln would carry his congressional district by 2000 votes but that Seward would probably lose it.90 Years later, Veatch recalled that he and Allen went to Chicago instructed to vote for Bates if the Missourian seemed to have a chance. To find out if he did, they journeyed to St. Louis to confer with Bates’s main supporters; en route they canvassed the situation thoroughly and concluded that Bates could not win the nomination. Veatch told Allen that he would vote for Lincoln, whom he had heard in 1844 speak very effectively. Allen had also heard Lincoln sixteen years earlier and was impressed by the fact that he had spent his boyhood and adolescence in their region of Indiana. At St. Louis, they inferred that Bates’s champions did not really expect him to win and only put him forward in the hopes of securing a cabinet post.

When Veatch and Allen reached Chicago, they worked hard to persuade their colleagues to support Lincoln.91

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90 Cyrus M. Allen to Henry S. Lane, Vincennes, 7 May 1860, typed copy, Lane Papers, Indiana University.
91 T. Hardy Masterson “Nomination of Lincoln,” Rockport, Indiana, correspondence, 20 November, Indianapolis Journal, 22 November 1896; Cyrus M. Allen to Lincoln, Vincennes, 8 November 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress. Masterson interviewed Veatch shortly before his death. Veatch’s father was a clergyman who preached at Little Pigeon Creek, according to George H. Honig. Honig, “Abe
Helping to win over the Hoosiers was the eloquence of Gustave Koerner.92 When he heard that Frank Blair and other spokesmen for Bates were addressing the Indianans, he and Orville Browning hurried over to their conclave where he asked to speak on behalf of Lincoln. Blair had been arguing that Bates could carry Missouri and Maryland, thus cleansing the party of the taint of sectionalism.93 Koerner denied that Bates could win his home state against Douglas and explained that Bates did not deserve the support of Germans, for in 1856 he had presided at the Whig national convention which had endorsed the Know-Nothing candidacy of Millard Fillmore. Moreover, Bates had supported Know-Nothings in St. Louis municipal elections. Germans throughout the country would shun him, Koerner warned. He predicted that if Bates were nominated, the Germans would place an independent ticket in the field. (On May 14 and 15, German leaders met at the Deutsches Haus in Chicago and threatened to bolt the party should Bates be nominated.)94 When Koerner mentioned Lincoln’s name, the crowd applauded vigorously. Browning, who had once favored Bates, assured the Hoosiers that Lincoln was a good Whig who opposed nativism. He concluded his remarks “with a most
beautiful and eloquent eulogy on Lincoln, which electrified the meeting. "95 (In Illinois, it was said that Browning’s oratorical gifts were surpassed only by Edward D. Baker’s.)96

Caleb B. Smith and John D. Defrees championed Bates, but soon gave up when it became obvious that he could not win. Henry S. Lane had at first backed McLean, then Bates, but “was frantic for Lincoln as soon as he saw that the Seward column could not be broken by anybody else.”97 Other Hoosiers shared Lane’s alarm at the prospect of an early Seward victory. To meet that threat, they agreed to vote unanimously for Lincoln or Cameron or McLean as long as any of one of them appeared capable of winning. (McLean, known as a “splendid antique,” was in fact out of the running.)98 There seemed to be a fair chance that the Indianans would support Cameron until dissention within the Pennsylvania ranks, especially by delegates from the western part of the state, cooled their enthusiasm.99

With other alternatives to Seward fast fading, Veatch and Allen managed to convince all but two of their colleagues to support Lincoln; one of the holdouts agreed to abstain and the other they eventually won over. Ably assisting them was Dr. Eric


96 Koerner, Memoirs, 1:479; Carr, The Illini, 95.


98 New York Herald, 12 May 1860.

Locke.\(^{100}\) Bates’ supporters “concluded that the only way to beat Seward was to go for Lincoln as a unit,” and on the night of May 15, the Indianans decided to back the Rail-splitter.\(^{101}\) From that point on they worked efficiently and actively, night and day, cooperating with the Illinoisans to promote Lincoln’s candidacy.\(^{102}\) This was a key turning point, for it elevated Lincoln above the status of a mere favorite son and made him seem like a truly viable candidate.\(^{103}\) Easterners were impressed with the united front presented by those two swing states.

The offer of a cabinet post to their state may have helped persuade some Indiana delegates to back Lincoln. David Davis allegedly promised that Lincoln would appoint Caleb B. Smith to head a department. The evidence supporting this hypothesis is contradictory. On the one hand, Davis flatly denied it. In September, he told Thomas H. Dudley: “Mr Lincoln is committed to no one on earth in relation to offices—He promised nothing to gain his nomination, and has promised nothing since—No one is authorized to speak for him.”\(^{104}\) Shortly after the convention, Leonard Swett informed a friend that “No pledges have been made, no mortgages executed.”\(^{105}\) On May 21, Lincoln wrote Joshua Giddings: “It is indeed, gratifying to my feelings, that the responsible position assigned

\(^{100}\) David Davis to Lincoln, Bloomington, 31 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

\(^{101}\) Defrees to Colfax, [Chicago, 18 May 1861], in O. J. Hollister, Life of Schuyler Colfax (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1886), 148; Swett to Josiah H. Drummond, 27 May 1860, Portland, Maine, Evening Express, n.d., copied in the New York Sun, 26 July 1891; Chicago correspondence by Simon Hanscom, 9 p.m., 15 May, New York Herald, 16 May 1860; Chicago Press and Tribune, 1 June 1860.


\(^{103}\) McClure, Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 30.

\(^{104}\) Davis to Thomas H. Dudley, Bloomington, 1 September 1860, Dudley Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

me, comes without conditions, save only such honorable ones as are fairly implied.”

Ten days later he assured callers, “I . . . have made no pledges to any man and intend to make none.”

On the other hand, several people testified that at the Chicago convention, Indiana was promised a cabinet seat. One delegate, William T. Otto, a leading Indiana Republican who was to serve as Lincoln’s assistant secretary of the interior, told Matilda Gresham, wife of Walter Q. Gresham, “how Caleb B. Smith imposed on Judge David Davis and Joseph Medill when the latter during the convention was pledging everything in sight to insure Mr. Lincoln’s nomination. ‘Mr. Smith,’ Judge Otto said, ‘made Judge Davis believe that the Indiana delegation would go to Seward unless Smith was promised a place in the Cabinet; when the truth was that none of us cared for Smith, and after we got to Chicago and looked over the ground all were for Lincoln.’” Mrs. Gresham stated: “That the pledge was made I have heard from Judge Davis’s own lips.”

Fishback, a law partner of the Republican state chairman of Indiana, reported in January 1861: “There was a determination and a promise on the part of Mr Lincoln to give Mr. C.

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106 Basler, ed., Collected Works of Lincoln, 4:51. This was in response to Giddings’s letter of May 19. Lincoln said “that, although he should reply to very few letters, this was one which deserved a response, and should receive it.” Independent Democrat (Concord, New Hampshire), 7 June 1860.

107 Albert Hale to Theron Baldwin, Springfield, 31 May 1860, in Michael Burlingame, ed., An Oral History of Abraham Lincoln: John G. Nicolay’s Interviews and Essays (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), 96. See also same to same, Springfield, 15 June 1860, ibid., 97. Soon after Lincoln’s election, when he read a letter from Medill about the appointment of Cameron, he said “that he felt himself under no promise or obligation to appoint anyone; that if his friends made any agreements for him they did so over his expressed direction and without his knowledge.” William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Weik, Herndon’s Lincoln, ed. Douglas L. Wilson and Rodney O. Davis (1889; Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 284.

108 Washington correspondence, 5 January, New York Herald, 7 January 1861. Harry E. Pratt, an authority on the life of David Davis, wrote that Davis and his allies “had given more or less definite promises of places in the cabinet to Caleb B. Smith of Indiana and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania.” Harry E. Pratt, “Simon Cameron’s Fight for a Place in Lincoln’s Cabinet,” Bulletin of the Abraham Lincoln Association, no. 49 (September 1937), 4.

B. Smith a place in his Cabinet."\(^{110}\) Joseph Medill recalled that Charles Henry Ray, after meeting with the Hoosier delegation, announced: “We are going to have Indiana for Old Abe, sure.” When asked how its support had been obtained, Ray explained: “By the Lord, we promised them everything they asked. We promised to see Smith put in the cabinet.”\(^{111}\) On May 14, Ray had told Lincoln that he should authorize friends (like Judd, Davis, or himself) to speak on his behalf, because a “pledge or two may be necessary when the pinch comes.”\(^{112}\) Similar advice had reached Lincoln from Mark W. Delahay, who on May 16 wrote: “If we could tonight say to Ohio, Penna, Mass. and Iowa – concentrate on [Lincoln] . . . and your . . . representative men . . . may dispense whatever patronage they respectively are . . . entitled to . . . you would beyond doubt be nominated.”\(^{113}\) In January 1861, Jesse W. Fell recommended that Lincoln appoint men from Indiana and Pennsylvania to cabinet posts because “such a disposition of favors was a good deal spoken of at Chicago.”\(^{114}\) Herndon said Davis pledged to see that Smith got a cabinet post.\(^{115}\) A Missouri delegate who helped lead the Bates forces recalled that “Nineteen of the Indiana vote[s] and fifteen of the Pennsylvania votes had been secured for Bates. . . . Judge Davis, Lamon, and Swett, traded off a cabinet position to Caleb

\(^{110}\) Fishback to his brother Tip, Indianapolis, 19 January 1861, photostatic copy, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis. Fishback added that “for some reason the matter has been reduced from a supposed certainty to a perplexing probability or, more properly perhaps, an improbability.”

\(^{111}\) Interview with Medill by George Alfred Townsend on the eve of the Republican national convention of 1888, reproduced in the Chicago Tribune, 7 February 1909.


\(^{113}\) Delahay to Lincoln, Chicago, 17 May 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

\(^{114}\) Fell to Lincoln, Bloomington, 2 January 1861, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

Smith for our Indiana votes and another place in the cabinet to Simon Cameron for our Pennsylvania votes.”¹¹⁶

Both Davis and Swett acknowledged later that they had used questionable tactics to win votes at the convention. Davis told Wirt Dexter, a leading Chicago attorney, that he and his allies won over delegates by “making promises to bring them into line. Sometimes the promises overlapped a little.”

Dexter asked, “you must have prevaricated somewhat?”

“‘PREVARICATED?’ replied Davis in his high voice, raising his right hand . . . and gesturing towards Mr. Dexter, ‘Prevaricated, Brother Dexter? We lied, lied like hell.”¹¹⁷

Swett told a fellow attorney “of his labors with Cameron; of the promises he made Pennsylvania on behalf of Mr. Lincoln, and of the subsequent difficulty he encountered in persuading Mr. Lincoln to carry out the contracts, or ‘bargains,’ as Mr. Lincoln called them.”¹¹⁸

In late November 1860, John D. Defrees warned Davis that the president-elect should not ignore Indiana when cabinet members were chosen, “considering some matters occurring at Chicago within your knowledge,” which if revealed “would be unfortunate and might give great dissatisfaction.”¹¹⁹ Swett confided to his law partner,

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¹¹⁷ This conversation took place at a dinner party given by N. K. Fairbank at his summer home at Lake Geneva. Memorandum by Kellogg Fairbank, Chicago, 7 April 1926, enclosed in Janet Fairbank to Albert J. Beveridge, New York, 9 April [1926], Beveridge Papers, Library of Congress.


Peter S. Grosscup, that he and Davis had promised the Indiana delegation that a Hoosier would receive a cabinet post if they backed Lincoln for the nomination.\footnote{Washington correspondence by Frank G. Carpenter, 22 January, Cleveland \textit{Leader}, 23 January 1885; “Presidents’ Cabinets,” undated clipping [probably February 1893] of an article by Frank G. Carpenter from the Washington \textit{Evening Star}, scrapbook, Frank G. Carpenter Papers, Library of Congress.}

A few days after the convention, Davis made a promise to A. M. Whitney, father of Lincoln’s friend Henry C. Whitney and a leading Illinois Know Nothing, who wrote Davis in 1863: “You will perhaps recollect that soon after the nomination of Mr Lincoln I met you on the cars as you was returning home from Springfield [ca. May 22] you said you had had a full and confidential conversation with Mr Lincoln, that he felt much anxiety in regard to what course the American party would take in this State, in the approaching elections[,] that if they supported their own party nominations it would be likely to throw the Electoral Votes of this State into the hands of the Democrats as it did in 1856[,] that he felt a natural ambition to carry his own State, but that much might depend upon the action of the third party (which by the way we estimated to be at least 40,000 strong)[.] I said to you that regardless of my own party I should support Mr L with whatever influence I had – that I had supported Fremont in ’56 notwithstanding I received over 37,000 votes for Am[erican Party] Elector myself in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Con[gressional] Dist[RICT.] You remarked that if Mr Lincoln was elected that I should be remembered and well taken care of and you said that in saying so that you spoke by authority.”\footnote{A. M. Whitney to David Davis, Chicago, 1 August 1863, Davis Papers, Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield. Whitney had made his appeal verbally a few days earlier. That prompted Davis to write Lincoln recounting the story and asking him to consider appointing Whitney to some post. Davis to Lincoln, Bloomington, 28 July 1863, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.} At Chicago, Davis probably made a similar offer to the Indiana delegation. In all likelihood, he did not specify that the post would go to Smith (who became secretary of the interior in 1861) but rather simply pledged that a Hoosier would be named to some cabinet.
position and that he would personally urge Smith’s appointment.\textsuperscript{122} After the November election, Davis did lobby vigorously on behalf of Smith, telling Lincoln: “No one rendered more efficient service from Indiana, at the Chicago Convention than he [Smith] did. . . . without his active aid & co-operation, the Indiana delegation, could not have been got as a unit to go for you. And until we had got the Indiana delegation entirely united, we could not properly appeal to the other delegations for votes.”\textsuperscript{123} On the day of his nomination, Lincoln received a telegram from Davis suggesting that certain pledges had been made: “Write no letters and make no promises till You see me.”\textsuperscript{124}

It was also agreed that the rich merchant William P. Dole, a shrewd politician and delegate who had lived in Indiana and was then residing in Illinois, would be named commissioner of Indian affairs. In 1861, Dole was appointed to that post.\textsuperscript{125}

When the cabinet was finally selected, Francis Preston Blair, Sr., whose son Montgomery became postmaster general, said the president “has suffered himself to be seduced by a grateful & unsuspicious heart into early commitments which he has had too much pride upon the point of honor involved in promises – although made by others – to revoke.” Blair did not specifically refer to Smith and Cameron, but he was in all likelihood talking about at least one of them.\textsuperscript{126} Similarly, Gideon Welles wrote that

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\item\textsuperscript{122} Thomas, “Caleb Blood Smith,” 156-78. One of Davis’s biographers, who doubts that a bargain was struck, suggests that Davis might have pledged to lend his personal support for Smith as a cabinet appointee. Willard King, \textit{Lincoln’s Manager, David Davis} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 38.
\item\textsuperscript{123} Davis to Lincoln, Danville, Illinois, 19 November 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.
\item\textsuperscript{124} Davis to Lincoln, Chicago, 18 May 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.
\item\textsuperscript{126} Blair to Martin Van Buren, Silver Spring, 7 March 1861, Van Buren Papers, microfilm ed. In this letter Blair praised Bates, Chase, Welles, and his son Montgomery; Seward, Smith, and Cameron were unmentioned.
\end{itemize}
Lincoln wanted to appoint William L. Dayton to the cabinet, “but the pressure from without as well as from within the state [of Pennsylvania], and certain complications of his friends, not of himself[,] led to the substitution of Mr Cameron for Mr Dayton.”127

THE PLATFORM

The convention opened on Wednesday, May 16, with David Wilmot of Pennsylvania serving as temporary chairman.128 Orville Browning called him “a dull, chuckle headed, booby looking man” who “makes a poor presiding officer.”129 The convention hall, specially built for the occasion, was known as the Wigwam because it resembled an Indian longhouse. A large, clumsy, solid, barn-like structure, measuring 100 x 180 feet, with a capacity of twelve thousand people, it was constructed “of rough timber, decorated so completely with flags banner, bunting, etc., that when filled it seemed a gorgeous pavilion aflame with color and all aflutter with pennants and streamers.” The interior resembled a huge theater whose stage was occupied by the delegates and the press. The acoustics were so good that an ordinary voice could easily be heard throughout the building.130 One journalist deemed it a “small edition of the New

127 Undated memo by Welles, Lincoln’s Cabinet Collection, Lincoln Museum, Fort Wayne.
York Crystal Palace.”

An “overflowing heartiness and deep feeling pervaded the whole house,” John G. Nicolay remembered. “No need of a claque, no room for sham demonstration here! The galleries were as watchful and earnest as the platform. There was something genuine, elemental, uncontrollable in the moods and manifestations of the vast audience.” The city was awash with visitors, some of whom wound up sleeping on tables at billiard parlors. The first two days were devoted to routine business and to adopting a platform that criticized attempts to limit the rights of immigrants; endorsed the sentiments of the Declaration of Independence; condemned disunionism, the popular sovereignty doctrine, and threats to reopen the African slave trade; upheld the right of states to regulate their own institutions; denounced the Buchanan administration’s extravagance, corruption, abuse of power, and support of the Lecompton Constitution; maintained that the normal condition of the territories was freedom; called for the immediate admission of Kansas as a free state; and endorsed protective tariffs, internal improvements (including a Pacific railroad), and homestead legislation. The plank on corruption was emphatic: “That the people justly view with alarm the reckless extravagance which pervades every department of the Federal Government; that a return to rigid economy and accountability is indispensable to arrest the system of plunder of the public treasury by favored...

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133 Chicago Press and Tribune, 17 May 1860.
partisans; while the recent startling developments of fraud and corruption of the Federal metropolis, show that an entire change of administration is imperatively demanded.\textsuperscript{134} The platform committee omitted any reference to the Declaration of Independence. When doughty old Joshua R. Giddings moved from the floor that a plank endorsing its principles be added, his motion was defeated. Angered, he stormed out of the Wigwam, whereupon young George William Curtis of New York made a stirring speech which reversed that action. Giddings came back radiant.\textsuperscript{135}

Not everyone was pleased with this platform, which was largely the handiwork of Horace Greeley.\textsuperscript{136} There was “a good deal of grumbling on all sides about the equivocal nature of the platform on the question of slavery in the Territories,” a plank that Greeley and Eli Thayer had drafted.\textsuperscript{137} The \textit{Tribune} editor took credit for divesting the platform “of all needlessly offensive or irritating features – such as that concerning the ‘twin relics of barbarism,’ and the requirement that Congress shall positively prohibit Slavery in every Territory whether there be or be not a possibility of its going thither.”\textsuperscript{138} Thayer claimed that Greeley had originally proposed to endorse the Wilmot Proviso. “I said,” Thayer recalled, “it was nonsense now, and worse, to insert this in our Platform, since we

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  \item \textsuperscript{134} \textit{Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions of 1856, 1860 and 1864} (Minneapolis: Charles W. Johnson, 1893), 131-33. Greeley said he wrote the homestead plank to his own liking. Greeley to Colfax, New York, 20 June 1860, Greeley Papers, New York Public Library.
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Murat Halstead, “A Historic Day,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, 5 June 1892.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Chicago correspondence by Murat Halstead, 16 and 17 May, \textit{Cincinnati Commercial}, 17 and 18 May 1860.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Card by Greeley, New York, 20 February, New York \textit{Tribune}, 20 February 1861.
\end{itemize}
had shown in the Kansas contest how free States could be made without it. As matters were, there could never be another slave State, and that it would be much wiser and safer to encourage the freedom-loving people of the North to trust in themselves and their own acts for the restriction of slavery, rather than in any act of Congress, which had always disappointed us.” Greeley acquiesced and wrote the plank that was adopted despite the objections of some committee members, including George F. Talbot of Maine, George Boutwell of Massachusetts, and Carl Schurz.\textsuperscript{139} Abolitionists complained that “by omission at least,” the platform “surrenders its old non-extension of slavery policy, and thus virtually endorses the ‘popular sovereignty’ doctrine.”\textsuperscript{140} In fact, however, the platform explicitly condemned popular sovereignty and offered settlers in the territories the option of forbidding slavery in their midst or having Congress do that for them.\textsuperscript{141} Pennsylvanians would probably have objected to the tepid, obscure tariff plank if the noise and confusion in the Wigwam had not made it seem inexpedient to do so.\textsuperscript{142} That weak endorsement of protectionism, which Democrats scorned as “two-faced – Tariff & Free Trade,” had been grudgingly inserted to placate Greeley and the Keystone State.\textsuperscript{143}


\textsuperscript{140} The Liberator (Boston), 25 May 1860.

\textsuperscript{141} Don E. Fehrenbacher, Lincoln in Text and Context: Collected Essays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 56. The plank read: “That the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom; That as our Republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that ‘no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’ it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United States.”

\textsuperscript{142} Chicago correspondence, 19 May, Philadelphia Press, 21 May 1860.

The Pittsburgh Post rightly noted that the Republicans’ tariff plank “was introduced to conciliate the protectionists of Pennsylvania while it was so worded as to give no offense to the free-trade Republicans of New York and elsewhere.”

The fourteenth plank, which dealt with immigrants’ rights and was intended as a slap at the Massachusetts two-years’ amendment, angered the Bay State delegation, which protested against it “in the strongest terms.” The Massachusetts men argued that “the insult offered the State by the 14th clause can only be wiped out by the nomination of Banks or Wade,” and the former members of the American party objected “loudly against the submission of the Convention to the demands of the German leaders,” saying “it will cost them Connecticut and Rhode Island.” This so-called “Dutch plank” was regarded in some circles as the result of “undue pandering to German fanaticism” in part because it had been written by two Germans – Carl Schurz and Gustave Koerner – over the objections of Eastern leaders like Thomas H. Dudley of New Jersey. Radical Germans, Reading Gazette and Democrat, 2 June 1860, quoted in Edgar B. Cale, “Editorial Sentiment in Pennsylvania in the Campaign of 1860,” Pennsylvania History 4 (1937): 222.


145 It read: “That the Republican Party is opposed to any change in our Naturalization Laws or any State legislation by which the rights of our citizenship hitherto accorded to immigrants from foreign lands shall be abridged or impaired; and in favor of giving a full and efficient protection to the rights of all classes of citizens, whether native or naturalized, both at home and abroad.”


on the other hand, dismissed it as a mere “plaster for this Massachusetts wound.”

But most delegates received the platform with enthusiasm. When the announcement came that it had been unanimously adopted, multitudes in the Wigwam “sprang to their feet, and cheers upon cheers, deafening, tumultuous and rapturous, went up from every throat. Men waved their hats – ladies their handkerchiefs – reporters their written pages – and all screamed with very joy” for over ten minutes. Murat Halstead thought that a “herd of buffaloes, or lions, could not have made a more tremendous roaring.”

A Republican newspaper called the plank condemning government corruption “the strongest practical point in the platform; and it will serve more than all things else to keep the Republican party united and determined.” The paper rightly pointed out that there was “a feeling that corruptions have grown frightfully rank at Washington, and that it is high time that the honest masses should interfere. The great document of this canvass will not be the Kansas Committee report, but the Covode Committee report; and the great watchword will be not antagonism to slavery, but ‘honest Abe Lincoln.’” Though exaggerated, there was much truth in this prediction. Slavery would dominate the campaign, but the corruption issue helped induce Know Nothings and others who had shied away from the Republicans four years earlier to join them in 1860.

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149 Chicago *Journal*, 17 May 1860.


WINNING PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW ENGLAND

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, Davis and his allies, having secured Indiana, concentrated their attention on Pennsylvania, whose favorite son candidate, Simon Cameron, would receive almost all the state’s votes on the first ballot but stood no chance of winning the nomination. The Pennsylvanians’ support was gained with the material aid of John A. Andrew of Massachusetts, who was to achieve fame as the Civil War governor of his state. On the eve of the convention, a New England delegation led by Andrew made a proposition to their Keystone State counterparts. Though ideologically sympathetic to Seward, the New Englanders wanted above all to win in November and feared that the New Yorker could not do so; along with the rest of the convention delegates, they regarded Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, and Illinois as keys to

153 Cameron worked hard to get a unanimous delegation, but western Pennsylvanians refused. Lincoln praised Cameron for not sending a “packed delegation,” but the Chief in fact had tried his best to pack it. John Allison to Lyman Trumbull, New Brighton, Pennsylvania, 4 June 1861, Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress. On February 22, the Pennsylvania Republican state convention had voted 127 to 4 to endorse Cameron, but that applied only to delegates chosen by the convention. Some delegates could be selected by the voters in congressional districts. J. P. Sanderson to John A. Andrew, Philadelphia, 8 March 1860, Andrew Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; William Henry Russell, “A Biography of Alexander K. McClure” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1953), 150. William D. Kelley told Lincoln “that the friends of no man gave you the vote of Penna at Chicago. When the special friends of Genl Cameron were attempting to force our delegation into a position that would give a colour of truth to their allegation ‘that he was the only man who could carry this state’ their threat was -- and it was most earnestly made -- that they could ‘smash the machine’ by voting for Seward if we did not give him a unanimous vote.” Kelley to Lincoln, Philadelphia 29 November 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress. According to A. K. McClure, who attended the convention, about one fourth of the Pennsylvania delegates were earnest supporters of Cameron, another quarter willing to vote for him with much less enthusiasm, and about one half were willing to vote for him on the first ballot if it were clear that he could not win the nomination. McClure thought that the “delegation was really for McLean. Lincoln had the Wilmot element of the delegation for him as against Bates, & it took but little management to control enough to give him a majority.” Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania: A Connected and Chronological Record of the Commercial, Industrial and Educational Advancement of Pennsylvania, and the Inner History of All Political Movements Since the Adoption of the Constitution of 1838 (2 vols.; Philadelphia: J.C. Winston, 1905), 1:405; McClure to Ward Hill Lamon, Philadelphia, 8 May 1871, Jeremiah Black Papers, Library of Congress.

154 Chicago correspondence by Samuel Bowles, 16 May, Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican, 19 May 1860.
victory. New Jersey, like Pennsylvania, was backing a favorite son, William L. Dayton, who was clearly unable to secure the nomination. Illinois and Indiana supported Lincoln. So Andrew proposed that the four swing states hold a joint caucus and try to unite on a candidate. Those states agreed to seek a consensus, and on May 17 delegates from all of them met. Thomas Dudley of New Jersey, observing that no compromise candidate was emerging, successfully moved that a special committee of three members from each state be formed to recommend a standard bearer. From Pennsylvania, David Wilmot, B. Rush Peterkin, and Henry D. Moore, all Cameron backers, were chosen by Governor Andrew Reeder. Opponents of Cameron objected, saying that one of their number should be included. Moore was persuaded to step aside for William B. Mann, a rising boss of Philadelphia and a fierce critic of Cameron.\textsuperscript{155} The Keystone State delegation was so badly divided that half its members were poised to vote against Cameron.\textsuperscript{156}

David Davis headed the Illinois contingent, Caleb B. Smith the Indianans, and Dudley the Jerseymen. That evening at six o’clock they all gathered in David Wilmot’s rooms, where for five hours they negotiated without reaching a decision. Around ten

\textsuperscript{155} Frank B. Carpenter, “How Lincoln Was Nominated,” \textit{The Century Magazine} 24 (October 1882): 854-55; Smith Fuller to Lincoln, Harrisburg, 1 January 1860 [1861], Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

\textsuperscript{156} Henry D. Moore to Cameron, Chicago, 20 May 1860, Cameron Papers, Dauphin County Historical Society, Harrisburg. Moore claimed that only his appeal for unity on the very morning of the balloting (May 18) averted a bad split. The delegates from Pittsburgh and Philadelphia were unenthusiastic about Cameron. Joseph S. M. Young to Cameron, Erie, 23 May 1860, \textit{ibid}. John D. Defrees of Indiana asserted that “Altho’ the delegates to Chicago, pretended to be for Cameron, two thirds of them \textit{I know} did not want him nominated – and privately worked against him.” Defrees to David Davis, Washington, 13 January 1861, David Davis Papers, Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield. Cameron had alienated the friends of Congressman John Covode of Pittsburgh, who aspired to the governorship. Cameron’s men had dropped Covode and backed Curtin in return for Curtin’s support for the presidential nomination. A friend told Covode, “Cameron cannot count a single vote in Indiana County in the event he gets the Chicago nomination. Himself and the Democrats who controlled the Convention at Harrisburg sold you and sold your friends.” James G. McQuaid to Covode, n.p., 1 March 1860, Covode Papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh. The Philadelphia \textit{Sunday Dispatch} called Cameron “a contemptible, intriguing, local politician, who has no admirers out of Pennsylvania, and none here that are not bound to him by sordid motives.” That paper scornfully declared that to “talk of elevating a man like Simon Cameron to the Presidency, would be as absurd as to make a monkey captain of a company of soldiers.” Philadelphia \textit{Sunday Dispatch}, 27 November 1859, 26 February 1860.
o’clock Horace Greeley dropped by, observed the deadlock, and telegraphed the New York Tribune that Seward would be nominated the next day.¹⁵⁷ Finally Dudley suggested that each delegation rank order its preferences. Indiana, Illinois, and New Jersey quickly determined that Lincoln was the one they could agree upon.¹⁵⁸ In Pennsylvania, Cameron topped the list, and McLean, championed by Thaddeus Stevens, was second. Since neither of them could win the nomination, the choice of the third name would determine how Pennsylvania would go after casting a complimentary vote for her native son. The contest between Lincoln and Bates for that crucial third spot was close, with the Illinoisan prevailing by a few votes “after a tense struggle.”¹⁵⁹ According to John W. Forney, Curtin and some of Cameron’s supporters “who wished to nominate Hickman or Read for the Vice Presidency controlled the nomination of Lincoln.”¹⁶⁰ (On the first day of the convention, there had been much talk of a Lincoln-Hickman ticket.)¹⁶¹ Thus Lincoln became the choice of the twelve-member committee.

This proved to be a major turning point. It was also unexpected; when told of the

¹⁶⁰ Forney told this to Cameron. Cameron to Seward, Washington, 20 May 1860, Seward Papers, University of Rochester.
¹⁶¹ Chicago correspondence by Simon Hanscom, 9 p.m., 15 May, New York Herald, 16 May 1860; Chicago correspondence by Murat Halstead, 16 May, Cincinnati Commercial, 19 May 1860.
committee’s decision, John A. Andrew “said he could not comprehend it.” The New Jersey and Pennsylvania men were unable to guarantee their states, but they promised to try. At 1 a.m. the Jerseymen met and agreed to support Lincoln after casting complimentary ballots for Dayton. The next morning, when the convention would vote, the Pennsylvania delegation was scheduled to consider the committee’s recommendation.

That night, while the Sewardites consumed 300 bottles of champagne in anticipation of their imminent triumph, Davis and his cohorts barely slept. Henry S. Lane was observed lobbying furiously for Lincoln, especially among the Vermont and Virginia delegations. Lane, Caleb B. Smith, and George K. Steele were “indefatigable, untiring, and persistent in urging the claims of ‘old Abe,’ and large numbers of delegates from other States are known to have been influenced by them,” a Hoosier reported. They succeeded in creating “the fatal break in Seward’s strength,” demolishing “his power in the New England and the slave State delegations.” Lane “asserted hundreds of times that the nomination of Seward would be death to him, and that he might in that case just as well give up the canvass. He did not feel like expending his time and money in carrying on a hopeless campaign, and would be disposed to abandon the contest.”

George W. Lawrence of Maine, who boarded at the hotel where the Pennsylvanians were staying,

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164 Chicago correspondence by J. L. K., 18 May, Madison, Indiana, Daily Courier, 21 May 1860.

“was incessant in his effort to procure their votes” for Lincoln.\footnote{David Davis and Leonard Swett to Lincoln, Danville, Illinois, 22 November 1860, State Department Records, Letters of Application and Recommendation During the Administrations of Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, 1861-1869, file for George W. Lawrence, Record Group 59, M 650, National Archives, Washington, D.C.}

Davis wanted to cut a deal with the Pennsylvanians, but the previous day Lincoln had sent a terse message via Edward L. Baker: “Make no contracts that will bind me.”\footnote{Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Lincoln, 278; E. L. Baker, interview with Herndon, [1865-66], Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants, 435; “Mr. Lincoln’s Commissals,” Chicago Press and Tribune, 28 May 1860.}

According to Henry C. Whitney, Baker “related that when he read the note to the delegates and workers gathered at the Lincoln headquarters he was greeted with a burst of laughter.” Davis, who guffawed louder than anyone else, said: “Lincoln ain’t here, and don’t know what we have to meet, so we will go ahead, as if we hadn’t heard from him, and he must ratify it.”\footnote{Jesse W. Weik, “Indiana at 1860 G. O. P. Convention in Chicago,” undated clipping from the Indianapolis Sunday Star, Lincoln Museum, Fort Wayne; Whitney, Lincoln the Citizen, 289.} Davis and Swett negotiated with the leading Cameron operatives, John P. Sanderson and Joseph Casey, “in the wee small hours of Friday morning.”\footnote{Swett, “David Davis,” address before the Chicago Bar Association, Chicago Times, 12 January 1887; Swett to the editor, Chicago, 13 July, Chicago Tribune, 14 July 1878; McClure, Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 157-58; Thurlow Weed Barnes, Life of Thurlow Weed including His Autobiography and a Memoir (2 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1884), 2:292.}

Before the convention met, Sanderson had predicted that Lincoln, unlike other contenders, might be able to carry the Keystone State.\footnote{J. P. Sanderson to Edward McPherson, Philadelphia, 20 March 1860, McPherson Papers, Library of Congress.} Cameron was allegedly offered a cabinet post in return for the votes of the Pennsylvania delegates on the second ballot.\footnote{Sources corroborating this conclusion are listed in John D. Stewart, II, “The Great Winnebago Chieftain: Simon Cameron’s Rise to Power, 1860-1867,” Pennsylvania History 39 (1972): 26n26. Cf. E. T. Bainbridge to Joseph Holt, [Louisville, Kentucky], 28 January 1863, Holt Papers, Library of Congress.} The Cameron representatives, wary because their counterparts had no authorization from Lincoln to act, were reassured that the Rail-splitter would never
repudiate a promise they made.  

Whitney’s account of the Cameron bargain has been challenged, but it seems plausible in light of abundant reminiscent testimony. Swett described to a convention delegate “his labors with Cameron,” the “promises he made Pennsylvania on behalf of Mr. Lincoln,” and “the subsequent difficulty he encountered in persuading Mr. Lincoln to carry out the contracts, or ‘bargains,’ as Mr. Lincoln called them.” Swett acknowledged that he had promised to have Cameron appointed to the cabinet if Pennsylvania supported Lincoln on the second ballot. In 1875, Cameron confided to an interviewer: “Lincoln told me that he was more indebted to Judd than any other one man for his nomination, but I told him I thought Davis and Swett did more for him. They bought all my men – Casey and Sanderson and the rest of them. I was for Seward[.] I knew I couldn’t be nominated but I wanted a complimentary vote from my own State. But Davis and the rest of them stole all my men. Seward accused me of having cheated him.”

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174 Reminiscences of Richard S. Tuthill in an obituary of Leonard Swett, Chicago Times, 9 June 1889. Tuthill was a delegate to the 1880 Republican National Convention from Illinois, served as the U. S. District Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, 1884-86, and was a judge on the Cook County Circuit Court.


176 Cameron, interview with Nicolay, Washington, 20 February 1875, Burlingame, ed., Oral History of Lincoln, 43. Cameron told Seward in the immediate aftermath of his defeat at Chicago: “I am pained at your defeat, and mortified that my state should have contributed to it.” Five months later, he declared to the New Yorker: “My whole ambition is to see you in the Presidency.” Cameron to Seward, Washington, 20 May 1860, and Lochiel, Pennsylvania, 13 November 1860, Seward Papers, University of Rochester. Lincoln’s estimate of his debt to Judd was shared by Francis P. Blair, Sr. Blair to Mrs. Norman B. Judd, Silver Spring, Maryland, 20 January 1861, Lincoln Collection, Brown University.
Cameron’s statement may have been disingenuous. To be sure, he had told Seward he would back him, but on May 10, Casey wrote the Chief from Chicago that if he could not be nominated, the Keystone State delegation would go for Seward “unless we are satisfied that we can do better for our State, by the arrangement we spoke of when I last saw you.” The terms of that arrangement are unknown, but evidently Cameron was willing to abandon Seward if he could obtain a better deal for Pennsylvania and himself. Seward’s confidential friends were, according to Casey, “overbearing and refused to talk of any thing but his unconditional nomination.” If Weed had been more flexible, Seward may have won.

Norman B. Judd’s son remembered his father describing a deal that gave Cameron an unspecified cabinet post in exchange for Pennsylvania’s votes. Alexander K. McClure of Pennsylvania, chairman of the Republican State Committee, testified that “Two positions in the Cabinet, one for Pennsylvania and one for Indiana, were positively promised by David Davis at an early period of the contest.” McClure added that the bargain with Pennsylvania was unnecessary, for Sanderson approached Swett and Davis with an offer to switch to Lincoln on the second ballot only after the delegation had made Lincoln their third choice, thus guaranteeing that the Illinoisan would receive their

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177 On May 10, Casey wrote to Cameron saying: “If the party are willing to pass over Mr. Seward its great representative Republican and take a man for expediency for the sake (principally) of carrying Penna. they must take Penna’s choice – If they refuse to do that, it will look as if they do not care for Penna. & then we are for Seward – unless we are satisfied that we can do better for our State, by the arrangement we spoke of when I last saw you.” Joseph Casey to Cameron, Chicago, 10 May 1860, Cameron Papers, Library of Congress.


179 Judd’s son Edward, recalling a story he heard his father tell many times, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 6 February 1916.

support once Cameron had been given a complimentary vote.181 The deal specified that Cameron would receive a cabinet post if a majority of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation would back him for it.182 McClure reported that Lincoln was unaware of the bargain until early 1861.183 Upon learning of it, the Rail-splitter reportedly declared: “They have gambled me all around, bought and sold me a hundred times. I cannot begin to fill all the pledges made in my name.”184

Contemporary evidence supports those recollections. On May 21, the Philadelphia Press reported a rumor that Cameron had been promised the treasury department portfolio.185 A week after the convention, Swett informed Lincoln about assurances he had given to delegates at Chicago. On May 16, in an attempt to woo the Pennsylvanians, he had approached an intimate friend, John W. Shaffer of Freeport, Illinois, who supported Cameron and enjoyed the confidence of some Keystone State delegates.186 Reluctantly Shaffer confided that Cameron’s supporters would not back Lincoln as their second choice for fear that he might deny them a fair share of patronage; they suspected that Lincoln’s allies like Judd and Peck would vindictively persuade him to shut them out because they had not supported the Rail-splitter early on. Encouraging them in this belief were eight Illinois delegates who, though pledged to Lincoln, actually preferred Seward. Those Illinoisans had been in discussions with both the Pennsylvania and New York

184 Hollister, Colfax, 147n.
185 Chicago correspondence, 19 May, Philadelphia Press, 21 May 1860
186 John W. Shaffer of Freeport had spoken earlier with Pennsylvanians and evidently joined the Cameron movement. He was an intimate friend of Swett. On Shaffer’s friendship with Pennsylvanians, see his letter to O. M. Hatch, Freeport, 28 June 1860, Hatch Papers, Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield.
delegations. After consulting with Davis, Swett tried to appease those eight men. As he told Lincoln, “I gave them the most solemn assurances I am capable of giving, that they should not only not be proscribed but that by-gones should be by-gones and they should be placed upon the same footing as if originally they had been your friends[.] After a general talk of all past grievances, which I answered as well as I could[,] they agreed to go to the two delegations [Pennsylvania and New York] and try to get you as their Second Choice[.] From that time I have the fullest confidence that they did labor honestly and effectively and I shall always believe it was through Shaffer we got the real friends of Cameron at that delegation.” Swett apologized for burdening Lincoln with this tale of wheeling and dealing: “Now of course it is unpleasant for me to write all this stuff and for you to read it[.] Of course I have never feared you would intentionally do anything unfair towards these men[.] I only mean to suggest the very delicate situation I am placed towards them so that you might cultivate them as much as possible[.] My position towards them is that I agreed to hold myself personally responsible to them for general fairness, and agreed forever to forfeit their confidence if it was not done.” After the November election, Swett informed Lincoln of other negotiations he had conducted at the convention: “The truth is, at Chicago we thought the Cameron influence was the controlling element and tried to procure that rather than the factions[.] The negotiations we had with them, so far as I can judge was one of the reasons, which induced the Cameron leaders to throw the bulk of that force to you.”\(^{187}\)

It is not clear exactly what Swett and Davis told the Pennsylvanians, but letters by Joseph Casey shed light on what may have been pledged. Less than a week after the

convention, Casey told Cameron that a virtually united Pennsylvania delegation was able “to control & make the nomination. It was only done after every thing was arranged carefully & unconditionally in reference to yourself to our satisfaction. . . . Mr. Lincoln’s confidential friend Hon. Leonard Swett, will be here [in Harrisburg] in a couple of weeks, & will bring with him assurances from Mr. Lincoln himself to you – &c.”188 (In fact, Swett did not visit the East during the campaign.)189 Five months later, Casey discussed patronage with Lincoln in Springfield. Afterward the Pennsylvanian wrote to Swett:

“From some things that occurred when I was at Springfield, my mind has since been in doubt, as to whether Mr. Lincoln has been made fully acquainted with the conversations and understandings had between you and Judge Davis on the one side, and myself, on the other, at the Tremont House, the night before the nomination.” Casey said he had been compelled to reveal their agreement to Cameron’s friends “to counteract other schemes, and overcome other inducements, proceeding from different quarters.”190 It is possible that Swett and Davis merely pledged that a Pennsylvanian would receive a cabinet post, but since that agreement had been struck with Cameron’s spokesman, clearly Cameron would be that man.

In addition to these recollections and contemporary documents, common sense suggests that deals were made on Lincoln’s behalf. Politicians strike bargains all the time,

188 Casey to Cameron, Harrisburg, 23 May 1860, Cameron Papers, Dauphin County Historical Society, Harrisburg.
189 Swett told John P. Sanderson that he was busy campaigning in Illinois and was importuned by candidates for state office to remain in the Prairie State. Sanderson to Simon Cameron, Philadelphia, 20 July 1860, Cameron Papers, Dauphin County Historical Society, Harrisburg.
190 Casey to Swett, Harrisburg, 27 November 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.
...and there is little reason to doubt the conclusion of historian Paul M. Angle: “that understandings, no less effective because they were not explicit, existed, is certain.”

Lincoln appointed both Cameron and Smith to his cabinet.

In addition to slowing Seward’s momentum and gaining Indiana’s twenty-six votes and most of Pennsylvania’s fifty-four (at least on the second ballot), Davis and his allies sought to bolster their strength at the outset. They found key support in New England, an especially important region because it led off the roll call. Thurlow Weed, Seward, and many delegates assumed that at least the northern part of that region was solidly behind the New Yorker. If Seward’s support there proved weak on the first ballot, it might have a profound psychological effect and smooth the way for Lincoln’s nomination. Gideon Welles of Connecticut, a Chase partisan, did yeoman service in rallying New Englanders against Seward. Ably assisting Lincoln’s men in lining up New England support was Amos Tuck of New Hampshire, a militant opponent of slavery who had served in Congress with Lincoln. Weeks later, Tuck modestly told David Davis: “It was but a trifle that I did, in attempting early to carry our entire delegation for Lincoln, but that trifle is enough to give me sincere satisfaction in the belief that the nomination was the only fit and proper nomination we could have made.” He had originally supported Chase, but as the convention approached, he switched his allegiance

192 In March, Samuel Bowles had assured Weed that “All the New England delegates, save Connecticut’s, will be . . . satisfactory” to Seward’s friends. Bowles to Weed, Springfield, Massachusetts, 5 March 1860, Barnes, Memoir of Weed, 260. Seward replied that “All New England [illegible word] to justify what Mr Bowles wrote you.” Seward to Weed, Washington, 10 March 1860, Weed Papers, University of Rochester.
193 Niven, Welles, 294-302.
to the Illinoisan. On May 14, Tuck informed his quondam House colleague: “I am taking hold of hands with our N[ew] Eng[land] delegates, and find the prospect good for general co-operation. Be not misled by our first votes. It will be expedient not to strike at first, but to let the west make the first move. But we shall come in, ‘on time.’” Other New Hampshiremen, including George G. Fogg, William E. Chandler, and Nehemiah Ordway, had long been working on Lincoln’s behalf. Fogg claimed that “I had much more to do with the action of our delegation than any other man.” Tuck, Fogg and the others reflected public opinion back home, for, as a Granite State newspaper noted, “Mr. Lincoln’s eastern tour last spring had given him popularity in N. H., and his sterling qualities were fully recognized.”

Swett, born and raised in Maine, lobbied his old friends from the Pine Tree State. He received help from George W. Lawrence, Governor Lot M. Morrill, Mark F. Wentworth, and James G. Blaine. On the train to Chicago, Blaine lobbied Morrill, but the governor remained non-committal until he arrived at the Windy City, where he confided that he was “disappointed in S[eward].” Blaine continued to lobby him and

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196 Amos Tuck to Lincoln, Chicago, 14 May 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.


199 Coos Republican (Lancaster, N. H.), 29 May 1860.

eventually he became an ardent champion of the Rail-splitter.201 Hannibal Hamlin, who realized that his favorite, John M. Read, had no chance, worked behind the scenes in Maine to keep the delegation from endorsing Seward.202 Davis and Swett told Lincoln that the Maine delegates at first “were apparently united for Gov’ Seward. We thought it important to break into the New England States, as much as we could, & that it was exceedingly important for us, as Maine led off, in the vote for President, & vice President, to have as much strength as possible from Maine.” Lawrence and Morrill won six votes for Lincoln on the first ballot.203 The uncommitted Maine delegates wanted to support Fessenden, but he expressed no interest.204 They then decided to go for Lincoln as long as he seemed viable.205 Helping to persuade the Pine State contingent to support

201 Blaine to his family, Springfield, 20 May 1860, Blaine Papers, Library of Congress; Morrill to William P. Fessenden, Chicago, 17 May 1860, Lincoln Collection, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland; Blaine to William P. Fessenden, Chicago, 16 May 1860, Fessenden Family Papers, Bowdoin College.


204 Ignatius Sargent to James S. Pike, Machias, Maine, 19 March 1860, Pike Papers, University of Maine; James S. Pike to Israel Washburn, New York, 1 February 1860, Washburn Family Papers, Washburn Memorial Library, Norlands, Maine; W. P. Fessenden to L. Deane, Washington, 18 January 1860, draft; Fessenden to his son Frank, Washington, 28 January 1860; James G. Blaine to Fessenden, Augusta, 6 March 1860; Fessenden to Elizabeth Warriner, Washington, 13 May 1860, Fessenden Family Papers, Bowdoin College; Hatch, Maine, 2:420-22. The Maine delegation balked at adopting the unit rule (which would have helped Seward) because it felt “a delicacy in saying anything which might be tortured into hostility, or even indifference” toward Fessenden. Charles S. Crosby to Thurlow Weed, Bangor, 9 March 1860, Weed Papers, University of Rochester.

205 Renssalaer Cram to William P. Fessenden, Portland, Maine, 6 June 1860, Fessenden Family Papers, Bowdoin College. On February 28, Blaine was able to get the state convention to instruct the delegates to support the candidate “most likely to obtain the largest number of votes, and the triumph of the cause above everything else.” At Hamlin’s suggestion, the Maine delegates polled their counterparts in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana, who indicated that Lincoln was more likely to carry their states than Seward. This convinced Lawrence, Leonard Andrews, and Cram. Hatch, Maine, 2:420-21.
Lincoln was Orville Browning, who addressed it on May 15.\textsuperscript{206} Greeley, who called Maine and Massachusetts “the two worst behaved delegations in the Convention,” bemoaned the absence of the New York\textit{ Tribune}’s ace Washington reporter, James Shepherd Pike, who “ought to have been able to do something” with his native state of Maine.\textsuperscript{207}

That same day Browning spoke to the delegates from New Hampshire.\textsuperscript{208} Many of them were former Know Nothings or Democrats and thus unenthusiastic about Seward.\textsuperscript{209} David Davis sent natives of Vermont, including Samuel C. Parks and Gurdon Hubbard, to angle for that state’s ten votes, all of which were pledged to favorite son Jacob Collamer on the first ballot.\textsuperscript{210} Under the leadership of Gideon Welles, the Connecticut and Rhode Island forces, while not pro-Lincoln, agreed to cast no votes for Seward.\textsuperscript{211}

Massachusetts was presumed to be safely in Seward’s camp, but the state convention refused to instruct the delegates to support him.\textsuperscript{212} After that conclave adjourned, having chosen nineteen radicals and seven moderates, the head of the credentials committee told Charles Sumner: “Massachusetts is overwhelmingly in favor

\textsuperscript{206} Pease and Randall, eds., \textit{Browning Diary}, 1:406 (entry for 15 May 1860). Browning was accompanied by David Davis and Thomas Marshall. Davis recalled that “I saw Browning at Chicago: he was 1" for Bates. I told him there was no Earthly Chance for him – Bates. Browning turned in and went for Lincoln heartily.” Davis, interview with Herndon, 20 September 1866, Wilson and Davis, eds., \textit{Herndon’s Informants}, 348.

\textsuperscript{207} Greeley to Schuyler Colfax, New York, 26 May 1860, Greeley Papers, New York Public Library.

\textsuperscript{208} Elwin L. Page, \textit{Abraham Lincoln in New Hampshire} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929), 115-29.

\textsuperscript{209} Lowden, “The People’s Party,” 120-21.

\textsuperscript{210} Swett, “David Davis,” address before the bar association, Chicago \textit{Times}, 12 January 1887; Wendt, Hubbard, 437.

\textsuperscript{211} Niven, \textit{Welles}, 296.

of Seward, as upon the whole, the representative of a higher anti-slavery sentiment than
any other man in the line of the nomination; & yet a majority of our delegates, I fear,
though elected as Seward men, & going to Chicago nominally to support him, really
mean to cut his throat.\textsuperscript{213} William Schouler explained to Lincoln that “Seward was not
Strong in Massachusetts. He had many Strong friends, but he had no Especial hold upon
the people. The truth is that there is a very strong American feeling in our Republican
ranks and the old Puritan faith, so hostile to popery and priest craft, permeates our whole
social system, and Seward has been regarded as ‘a seeker after popularity, through the
highways and byways of Popery and irishmen.’\textsuperscript{214} Delegation chairman John A. Andrew
sympathized with Lincoln’s cause, as did the influential editor of the Worcester Spy,
Congressman John D. Baldwin.\textsuperscript{215} In Massachusetts, Lincoln enjoyed the support of
Charles O. Rogers, Josiah Dunham, Timothy Davis, and Timothy Winn, all of whom
voted for the Illinoisan on each ballot. Boston merchant Samuel Hooper also worked
behind the scenes to thwart Seward and pave the way for Lincoln.\textsuperscript{216} Edward Lillie
Pierce, who claimed that he “favored the nomination of Lincoln and quite early too,”
voted for him on the third ballot, along with thirteen others in addition to the original four
backers.\textsuperscript{217} In addition, national committeeman John Z. Goodrich of Stockbridge, a major


\textsuperscript{214} William Schouler to Lincoln, Boston, 21 May 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.


\textsuperscript{216} Samuel Bowles to Charles H. Ray, Springfield, Massachusetts, 26 November [1860], Ray Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California; Barnes, \textit{Weed}, 1:622-23.

\textsuperscript{217} Pierce to Charles H. Ray, Boston, 4 January 1861, Ray Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California; memorandum of votes cast in the convention, John A. Andrew Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; statement of Pierce, [December 1889], Wilson and Davis, eds., \textit{Herndon’s Informants}, 683-84; William H. Herndon to E. L. Pierce, Springfield, 18 February 1861, Pierce Papers, Harvard University.
fundraiser for the party, urged his fellow Bay Staters to support Lincoln.  

David Davis’s minions also trolled for votes in southern state delegations (most notably Virginia and Kentucky) and in Midwestern states like Ohio (which was badly split among Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin F. Wade, and John McLean) and Iowa (where Lincoln’s old friend Hawkins Taylor lived and was working hard for his candidacy.)

By the time the convention opened on May 16, Lincoln’s operatives felt confident that they had secured about 100 votes for the initial ballot, with some reserves ready to be added on the second ballot (from Pennsylvania, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Delaware). That day Davis and Jesse K. Dubois wired Lincoln: “We are quiet but moving heaven and earth. Nothing will beat us but old fogy politicians. The heart[s] of the delegates are with us.”

VICTORY

218 Goodrich to Lincoln, Boston, 16 March 1865, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress. In April, Goodrich explained that he preferred Seward but wanted the party to win and said he would enthusiastically back another candidate more likely to do so than Seward “provided always that he be a republican in principle. A Republican we must have. No letting down of principles.” At first he thought McLean might fill the bill and eventually concluded that “the nomination of Lincoln was all things considered the wisest thing the convention could do.” Goodrich to Henry L. Dawes, Stockbridge, 17 and 25 April 1860 and Mississippi River, 8 June 1860, Dawes Papers, Library of Congress.

219 David Davis to Lincoln, Bloomington, 31 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress. According to Herman Kreismann, on May 15, the Ohio delegates’ first choice was Chase, second Wade (22 votes), then Lincoln (16), McLean (2), Seward (2), and Bates (2). Kreismann to E. B. Washburne, Chicago, 16 May 1860, Washburne Papers, Library of Congress. The legitimacy of the southern delegates was suspect; they represented few residents of their states and were chosen irregularly. Toledo Blade, n.d., copied in the Illinois State Register (Springfield), 16 July 1860. Iowa’s congressional delegation worked against Lincoln. Hawkins Taylor to William Butler, Washington, 22 March 1861; Hawkins Taylor to Jesse K. Dubois, Washington, 23 March 1861, Ozias M. Hatch Papers, Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield.

220 Davis and Dubois to Lincoln, Chicago, 16 May 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.
But most observers believed Seward had the nomination locked up.\textsuperscript{221} With remarkable prescience, the Chicago \textit{Times} estimated that on the first ballot, the senator would command 172 votes. (He actually received 173½.) Less accurately it predicted that Bates would get 100, Cameron 81, Lincoln 45, McLean 24, Banks 11, Chase 10, and Wade 5.\textsuperscript{222} Weed and his colleagues said “that if Seward is not the man, let the opposition bring forward a better candidate,” and they argued that “because the latter cannot probably unite upon anybody else, their candidate must and should be nominated.”\textsuperscript{223} They were encouraged when the convention voted down a proposal requiring that a majority of the whole electoral college was needed to nominate a candidate.\textsuperscript{224} (The defeated change, offered by an anti-Seward delegate from Massachusetts, would have stipulated that the winning candidate must secure 304 votes instead of 238.)\textsuperscript{225} Weed boasted that he “was sure of success.”\textsuperscript{226} Thursday night, Congressman Elbridge G. Spaulding wired the senator: “Your friends are firm & confident that you will be nominated after a few ballots.” E. D. Morgan echoed that sentiment: “We have no doubt of a favorable result tomorrow.” The next morning other Seward lieutenants assured their man: “Everything indicates your nomination today sure.”\textsuperscript{227} Straw polls taken on trains

\textsuperscript{221} Horace Greeley, “Last Week at Chicago,” New York \textit{Tribune}, 22 May 1860.
\textsuperscript{222} Chicago \textit{Times}, 16 May 1860, cited in the \textit{Illinois State Journal} (Springfield), 17 May 1860.
\textsuperscript{224} Chicago correspondence by Samuel Bowles, 17 May, Springfield (Massachusetts) \textit{Republican}, 18 May 1860.
\textsuperscript{225} The delegate was Samuel Hooper. Samuel Bowles to Charles H. Ray, Springfield, Massachusetts, 26 November [1860], Ray Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
\textsuperscript{226} Chicago correspondence by Joseph Howard, 18 May, New York \textit{Times}, 21 May 1860.
\textsuperscript{227} Spaulding to Seward, Chicago, 17 May 1860, telegram; Morgan to Seward, Chicago, 17 May 1860, telegram; Preston King, William M. Evarts, and Richard M. Blatchford to Seward, Chicago, 18 May 1860, telegram, Seward Papers, University of Rochester.
pouring into the Windy City showed overwhelming support for Seward.\textsuperscript{228} Thursday night at the New Yorker’s headquarters, bands played festive music and champagne “flowed freely as water.”\textsuperscript{229} Murat Halstead reported that “every one of the forty thousand men in attendance upon the Chicago Convention will testify that at midnight of Thursday-Friday night, the universal impression was that Seward’s success was certain.”\textsuperscript{230}

But that night, while Davis and his crew were securing the Pennsylvania delegation, anti-Seward New Yorkers, led by David Dudley Field, exerted themselves energetically. A prominent lawyer, Field had persuaded four other anti-Seward residents of the Empire State to join him in Chicago to work against their senator.\textsuperscript{231} They shared Wall Street lawyer George Templeton Strong’s opinion that Seward was “an adroit, shifty, clever politician” who “has used anti-Masonry, law reform, the common school system, and anti-slavery as means to secure votes, without possessing an honest conviction in regard to any of them.”\textsuperscript{232}

Accurately, Illinois Congressman John Farnsworth predicted early on May 18:


\textsuperscript{229} Chicago correspondence by Murat Halstead, 17 May, Cincinnati Commercial, 18 and 21 May 1860.

\textsuperscript{230} Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.

\textsuperscript{231} Reminiscences of James A. Briggs in Henry M. Field, The Life of David Dudley Field (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), 137-38. Field told Lincoln that after “an active correspondence through the State, I was able to get only four gentlemen to go to Chicago & hazard their political fortunes upon the chances of success. These were Mr [George] Opdyke, Mr [Hiram] Barney, Mr [John A. C.] Gray & Mr [Thomas B.] Carroll.” With their help, and that of letters by William Cullen Bryant and James S. Wadsworth, Field lobbied vigorously against Seward. David Dudley Field to Lincoln, New York, 3 January 1861, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress; Field to Francis P. Blair, New York, 20 November 1860, Blair Family Papers, Library of Congress. Judge John T. Hoogeboom claimed that Charles W. Graves of King’s County also lobbied for Lincoln at the convention. Hoogeboom to Lincoln, New York, 10 January [1862], ibid.

\textsuperscript{232} Nevins and Thomas, eds., Diary of George Templeton Strong, 3:282 (entry for 21 December 1862).
“Lincoln will be nominated. I think he is the second choice of everybody.”233

The Sewardites counted on mob psychology to reinforce the impression that their candidate’s triumph was inevitable. With many supporters serving as a gigantic claque, they planned to stampede the delegates in the Wigwam. The Lincolnites had not anticipated such a move. When they saw the crowd imported by the Seward forces, approximately 1000 men led by a uniformed band, they fired off telegrams summoning Illinoisans and Hoosiers to Chicago. Alexander H. Conner, the pro-Lincoln Republican State Chairman of Indiana, upon receiving such a message, took charge of rounding up backers of the Rail-splitter throughout the state, and the next day led thousands of Indianans to Chicago to join forces with a like number of Suckers. (On May 27, Swett reported: “After the first days we were aided by the arrival of at least 10,000 people from Central Illinois and Indiana.”)234 Frustrating Conner’s hopes of packing the Wigwam with this horde was a lack of entrance tickets. The quick-witted Conner obtained one ticket and persuaded a Chicago printer to run off 5000 copies of it, which were evenly distributed between the Illinois and Indiana contingents. They were instructed to arrive at the Wigwam early on May 18, the day when the voting would be held.235


That morning the cocksure Seward forces marched across town, confident that their man was about to win. While they paraded, the Lincoln shouters streamed into the Wigwam, where they were led by a leather-lunged Chicagoan and by one Dr. Ames of Ottawa. These two men, instructed to organize a cheering section, took up positions on opposite sides of the hall with orders to bellow when Lincoln’s name was placed in nomination and seconded. After demonstrating through the streets, the Seward marchers were astounded to learn that they could not all enter the packed convention hall, even though they held tickets. They were “appalled when they saw how they had been outgeneraled.”

Also frustrating the Seward forces were the seating arrangements devised by Judd, who as a member of the Republican National Committee had been assigned that task. Because New York expected to have its man named, Judd gave it the place of honor, in front, to the right of speaker’s rostrum. To isolate them from their counterparts in undecided states, he surrounded them with solid Seward delegations. To the left he deployed Illinois and Indiana; opposite those two, and very close by, Pennsylvania and Missouri were seated. “The advantage of the arrangement,” Judd recalled, “was, that when the active excitement and the canvassing in the Convention came on, the Seward men couldn’t get over among the doubtful delegations at all to log-roll with them, being absolutely hemmed in by their own followers who were not likely to be swerved from

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Historical Society (1931):185-86; reminiscences of Henry M. Russell, Illinois State Journal (Springfield), 20 January 1909. Gustave Koerner recalled that while “the friends of the other candidates held processions and marched around with bands of music, we had made arrangements that the Wigwam should at the earliest opening every morning be filled with Illinoians. We had them provided with tickets before tickets were distributed to others.” Koerner, Memoirs, 2:85. According to K. K. Jones, Abraham Jonas of Quincy also played a role in packing the Wigwam that memorable day. K. K. Jones to the editor, Quincy, 26 September, Chicago Tribune, 28 September 1882.

236 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.

237 A. K. McClure, Our Presidents and How We Make Them (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1900), 158.
their set preference for Seward.”

The preceding afternoon another development had thwarted the Sewardites. After the adoption of the platform, they were so confident that they insisted on commencing the vote. The Lincolnites, needing more time to shore up their support, unsuccessfully moved to adjourn. If the voting had then begun, Seward may have won. But George Ashmun, president of the convention, announced that “the papers necessary for the purpose of keeping the tally are prepared, but are not yet at hand, but will be in a few minutes.” The Sewardites were “greatly disgusted.” The motion to adjourn was renewed. Though there was “very little voting being done either way,” Ashmun ruled that the motion had carried. Seward’s supporters, “displeased but not disheartened,” entertained “no particle of doubt of his nomination.”

The morning of May 18, tension in the Wigwam ran high. John G. Nicolay reported that “the human tide begins pouring out of the hotels and setting toward the Great Republican Wigwam. Bad luck to the pedestrian whose business calls him the wrong way, for he is impeded, and jostled, and pushed back by the crowds that are rushing wigwamward, filling up both sidewalks on Lake street.” At the convention hall, “there is such a crowd around the doors as to require a ten or fifteen minutes scramble to get in. It is yet an hour until the Convention meets, but the wigwam is already crowded


240 Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions, 143; Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.

241 Chicago correspondence by Murat Halstead, 17 May, Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
with ten thousand eager, expectant spectators, the ladies with their gentlemen escorts
being comfortably seated in the vast galleries, while on the floor the men are standing
packed in one dense mass, leaving only a great sea of heads visible.” The hum of the
crowd was silenced by the opening prayer. “So marked is the change that you might shut
your eyes and fancy that the vast crowd had by magic disappeared.” After the minister
delivered the morning prayer, “the multitudinous hum again breaks forth, and the crowd
can scarcely wait to hear the President read two or three communications which he finds
on his table.” Who could care about railroad excursions or addresses from associations
“when the country is listening to hear the name of its chief ruler announced?” When it
was decided to begin voting, “there is a murmur of applause from the impatient
audience.” But then a “painful suspense is created as a debate springs up about the rules
of voting, which for a moment threatens to become stormy and delay action.” Mercifully
debate is cut short, and Ashmun announces that nominations may be made.242

Enough Seward men gained admission to raise a “deafening shout” when their
hero was nominated. Swett acknowledged that it “appalled us a little.”243 According to
Nicolay, the “confusion is quieted by the gesticulations of the chairman, into a tolerable
degree of silence, and the thousands of eyes turn instinctively to the other end of the hall,
where Norman B. Judd now rises from the center of the Illinois delegation, and with his
distinct and emphatic enunciation, nominates Abraham Lincoln.”244 Then, said Swett,

242 Chicago correspondence by Pike (John G. Nicolay), 18 May, Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), 23 May
1860.
243 Leonard Swett to Josiah H. Drummond, 27 May 1860, Portland, Maine, Evening Express, n.d., copied in
the New York Sun, 26 July 1891.
244 Chicago correspondence by Pike (John G. Nicolay), 18 May, Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), 23 May
1860.
“our people tested their lungs. We beat them a little.”245 Though Ashmun banged his gavel and ordered silence, the audience “like a wild colt with [the] bit between his teeth, rose above all cry of order, and again and again the irrepressible applause broke forth and resounded far and wide. The crowd outside took it up, and cheer after cheer from them indorsed the sentiments of their brethren within.”246 This “outburst was unexpected,” reported a journalist, and “its suddenness and vehemence seemed to electrify and startle the assembly. The Sewardites turned pale and looked wild.”247 As Nicolay recalled, “There is something irresistibly exciting in the united voice of a great crowd. For a moment the struggle appeared to resolve itself into a contest of throats and lungs.”248 The Sewardites outshouted the Lincolnites when their man’s nomination was seconded. “The effect was startling,” wrote Murat Halstead. “Hundreds of persons stopped their ears in pain. The shouting was absolutely frantic, shrill and wild. No Comanches, no panthers, ever struck a higher note, or gave to a scream more infernal intensity. Looking from the stage over the vast amphitheater nothing was to be seen below but thousands of hats – a black swarm of hats – flying with the velocity of hornets over a mass of human heads.”249

“The idea of our Hoosiers and Suckers being outscreamed would have been as bad to them as the loss of their man,” Swett remarked; so when Lincoln’s name was seconded, “Five thousand people at once leaped to their seats, women not wanting in that number, and the wild yell made soft whisper breathing of all that had preceded. No

247 Chicago Herald, 19 May 1860.
249 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
language can describe it. A thousand steam whistles, ten acres of hotel gongs, a tribe of 
Comanches, headed by a choice vanguard from pandemonium, might have mingled in the 
scene unnoticed.” Halstead used similar imagery to describe the noise generated by 
Lincoln’s supporters: “the uproar that followed was beyond description. Imagine all the 
hogs ever slaughtered in Cincinnati giving their death squeals together, a score of big 
steam whistles going together . . . and you can conceive something of the same nature.” 
Reinforcing the sound was the stamping of feet so vigorous that it “made every plank and 
pillar in the building quiver.” Seward’s delegates sat silent amidst this din, their faces 
growing pale “as the Lincoln yawp swelled into a wild hosanna of victory.” For five 
minutes the Lincolnites “waved hats, handkerchiefs, and arms, and shouted and yelled 
like savages.” A supporter of the New York senator pessimistically remarked, “We 
may easily guess the result.” The delegates cowered “before the stentorian power of 
the people and the majesty of physical force. The very moment it was clear that the 
crowd was for Lincoln, the tide set irresistibly in his favor. The delegates seemed to snuff 
the possibility of being left out when the future President should ‘make up his jewels,’ 
and commenced a general stampede, which increased every moment.” The shouting 
duel continued throughout the first ballot, with the Lincolnites generating more noise and 
enthusiasm whenever their man picked up votes (especially from Indiana and Illinois)

251 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
252 Chicago Herald, 19 May 1860.
254 Chicago Herald, 19 May 1860.
than did the Sewardites as their candidate surged.255

Helping to drain the color from the faces of those Sewardites was the unexpected announcement that Maine, instead of going for their champion as a unit, awarded six votes to Lincoln. Following on the heels of that shocker came New Hampshire, which awarded seven votes to Lincoln and only one to Seward. At 10:30 the previous night, Weed allegedly had obtained the Granite State’s promise to support his candidate.256 The Wizard of the Lobby had admonished them that if Seward were passed over, New York might not vote Republican in November. The New Hampshire delegation assured Weed that they liked Seward but shared the widely-held view that he could not carry the swing states and doubted that New York would go Democratic even if her favorite son were rejected.257 Shortly thereafter, Andrew G. Curtin told the delegation that if Seward won the nomination, he would withdraw his candidacy for governor of Pennsylvania because the senator at the head of the ticket would doom the party’s chances in the Keystone State.258 In Amos Tuck, Lincoln had an invaluable ally pleading his case to the New Hampshiremen.259 Thus, in New England, where Seward was supposedly dominant, he had fallen behind after the first two states had been polled. (McClure saw “several rural delegates from New England shed tears as they confessed that they must abandon Seward


256 Weed to Seward, Davenport, Iowa, 20 May 1860, and George M. Grier to Seward, Chicago, 18 May 1860, Seward Papers, University of Rochester.

257 James Watson Webb described the meeting between the New Yorkers and the New Hampshire delegation. New York Courier and Enquirer, 25 May, copied in the New York Herald, 27 May 1860. A New Hampshire journalist reported on May 16 that the state’s delegation favored Lincoln’s nomination, “believing it the most judicious.” Chicago correspondence by H. O. K., 16 May 1860, Coos Republican (Lancaster), 29 May 1860.

258 Reminiscences by an unidentified member of the Chicago Convention, Washington Post, 1 April 1895.

because he could not carry Pennsylvania and Indiana, and certainly more than one-third of all the delegates who voted for Lincoln in that convention did it in sincerest sorrow because compelled to abandon their great leader for the sake of victory.”)\textsuperscript{260} Of the eighty-two New England delegates, Seward received the backing of thirty-two and Lincoln of nineteen.

Another shock came when Virginia, a presumed Seward stronghold, cast fourteen votes for Lincoln and only eight for the senator. According to Murat Halstead, this was the crucial turning point on the first ballot: “The New Yorkers looked significantly at each other as this was announced.”\textsuperscript{261} Shortly after the convention, Greeley reported that “Virginia had been regularly sold out; but the seller couldn’t deliver. We had to rain red hot bolts on them, however, to keep the majority from going for Seward.”\textsuperscript{262} The chairman of that delegation supported the Illinoisan because he “was not a sectional man” and “would make a better run” than Seward.\textsuperscript{263} Kentucky also disappointed Weed, for it gave Seward only five of its twenty-three votes. (Cassius M. Clay explained to the New York senator that “it was difficult to get our delegation to vote for you, because the opposition press had taken the pains to single you out for denunciation: and because Chase was in continual communication . . . with our friends.”)\textsuperscript{264} According to a

\textsuperscript{260} McClure, Our Presidents, 156-57.
\textsuperscript{261} Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
\textsuperscript{262} Greeley to James Shepherd Pike, New York, 21 May 1860, Pike Papers, University of Maine.
\textsuperscript{263} Alfred Caldwell, quoted in Luthin, First Lincoln Campaign, 160. Weed said that a Virginia delegate told him shortly after the convention that he and several colleagues voted against the New Yorker because they “were informed that Mr. Seward had a very strong anti-Masonic record.” Weed told him that his information was accurate. Barnes, Memoir of Weed, 295.
\textsuperscript{264} Clay to Seward, n.p., 21 May 1860, Seward Papers, University of Rochester. Chase received eight Kentucky votes, to Lincoln’s six, Seward’s five, and Wade’s twelve. Clay favored Seward’s nomination if he himself could not be chosen the standard bearer. Clay to Thurlow Weed, n.p., 8 March 1860, Weed Papers, University of Rochester.
Sewardite, “That old sinner F. P. Blair with his two cubs Frank and Montgomery were active and bitter against Seward and did us a good deal of harm with the delegates from Virginia, Kentucky etc. who were inclined to go with us in the beginning.” During the balloting, the Empire State delegation “looked like a funeral procession.” As “the Lincoln vote rolled up the enthusiasm rolled up with it, until, when the count was ascertained, the ecstasy of Lincoln’s friends knew no bounds, and it seemed as though the roof of the wigwam were in danger of being lifted off by the concussion.” That count showed Seward leading with 173½ votes (only 3½ from the Lower North) to Lincoln’s 102, Cameron’s 50½, Chase’s 49, Bates’s 48, with the rest scattering. The announcement of the results “caused a fall in Seward stock. It was seen that Lincoln, Cameron and Bates, had the strength to defeat Seward; and it was known that the greater part of the Chase vote would go for Lincoln.” John G. Nicolay recalled that in “the groundswell of suppressed excitement which pervaded the convention there was no time to analyze this vote; nevertheless, delegates and spectators felt the full force of its premonition; to all who desired the defeat of Seward it pointed out the winning man with unerring certainty.”

In Springfield, however, Lincoln received the news with some concern. When a friend observed, “that’s a great deal better than we had any right to expect,” he replied: “I don’t like the looks of it; I imagine that about forty of those votes were cast for me by men who supposed they were bound to give me an empty compliment on the first ballot.

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266 Chicago correspondence by Simon Hanscom, 18 May, New York Herald, 19 May 1860.
267 Chicago correspondence, 18 May, New York Evening Post, 21 May 1860.
268 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
They were cast, according to my figuring, by friends of Wade and Bates. If so if I lose them on the next ballot, the nomination will also will also be lost, for in the Convention as in every-day life, everybody is more or less anxious to help a man who is traveling down hill.”

Back in Chicago, the second round of balloting began. The third state to be called, Vermont, gave Lincoln all ten of its votes, igniting “a spontaneous burst of applause” that was “with difficulty checked by the Chairman.” This significant gain (those ten votes had previously gone to favorite son Jacob Collamer) constituted “a blighting blow upon the Seward interest,” Halstead reported. “The New Yorkers started as if an Orsini bomb had exploded.” One of them thought that Vermont’s switch represented the turning of the tide, assuring Lincoln’s victory. Weed later complained that “Greeley took possession of a perverted Delegation from Vermont,” and the Tribune editor said it “was all we could do to hold Vermont by the most desperate exertions.” But the head of the Vermont delegation denied that Greeley had exercised much influence; rather, he said, the Green Mountaineers had listened to the pleas of the Pennsylvanians and Hoosiers, who begged them not to vote for Seward. Heeding that appeal, the Vermonters then noted Lincoln’s strength on the first ballot and decided to support him on the second as the

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270 Letter by a former employee of the editorial department of the Illinois State Journal to the editors of the Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), St. Louis, 20 May 1865, Missouri Democrat, n.d., copied in the Illinois State Journal (Springfield), 8 June 1865.

271 Chicago correspondence by Pike (John G. Nicolay), 18 May, Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), 23 May 1860.

272 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.


274 Weed to Seward, Davenport, Iowa, 20 May 1860, Seward Papers, University of Rochester; Greeley to James Shepherd Pike, New York, 21 May 1860, Pike Papers, University of Maine.
candidate most likely to win. They liked Seward, but feared he would lose; they also admired Cassius Clay, but he stood less of a chance than Seward. From Connecticut and Rhode Island, Lincoln received five more votes than he had gotten earlier. Thus New England awarded thirty-three votes to Seward and thirty-six to Lincoln.

Surprisingly, New Jersey gave the Rail-splitter none and Seward four, the remaining ten going to favorite son Dayton. Then came the stunning announcement that Pennsylvania cast forty-eight votes for Lincoln, a net gain of forty-four. The “fate of the day was now determined,” Halstead reported. Delaware switched its six votes from Bates to Lincoln, whose count increased by three in both Kentucky and Iowa and by six in Ohio. (Bates’s chief lobbyists, the Blairs, were staying with Lincoln’s friend Norman B. Judd, who probably urged them to support the Rail-splitter once their man faltered.) The totals were Seward 184½, Lincoln 181, Chase 42½, Bates 35, and the rest scattering. Seward had gained eleven to Lincoln’s seventy-nine.

When this result was telegraphed to Springfield, Lincoln cheered up. “I have no fault to find; I think the convention will nominate me on the next ballot,” he said

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275 Speech by Peter T. Washburn at Woodstock, Vermont, 7 June 1860, Vermont Standard (Woodstock), 8 June 1860. The rather conservative Vermont delegation included two Fillmore Whigs, E. N. Briggs and John W. Stewart, who would never have voted for Seward. Joseph H. Barrett to Salmon P. Chase, Cincinnati, 9 and 20 April 1860, Chase Papers, Library of Congress.


278 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.

279 Ada Judd to F. P. Blair, Sr., Chicago, 3 May 1860, Blair Family Papers, Library of Congress; J. P. Sanderson to Simon Cameron, Chicago, 11 May 1860, Cameron Papers, Library of Congress; F. P. Blair, Sr., to Julia [Judd], Silver Spring, 15 September 1860, Lincoln Collection, Brown University.
calmly.280

The third ballot, Nicolay recalled, “was begun amid a breathless suspense; hundreds of pencils kept pace with the roll-call, and nervously marked the changes on their tally-sheets.”281 Lincoln’s bandwagon gathered momentum rapidly. His total in Massachusetts grew by four, in New Jersey by eight, in Pennsylvania by four, in Maryland by nine, in Kentucky by four, in Ohio by fifteen, in Oregon by four, giving him a total of 231½, a scant one and a half votes short of victory. Seward had lost ground, slipping to 180. During the balloting, a Bates operative urged Greeley “to hold on for Bates” for “he had just seen Mr. Weed, and, if no nomination should be made, there would be a strong rally of Seward’s friends on Bates” during the next ballot.282

“A profound stillness suddenly fell upon the wigwam,” Nicolay recollected. All talking and fluttering of fans ceased. In the silence “one could distinctly hear the scratching of pencils and the ticking of telegraph instruments on the reporters’ tables. No announcement had been made by the chair; changes were in order, and it was only a question of seconds who should speak first.” While everyone sat with the keenest expectancy, David K. Cartter, head of the Ohio delegation, stood upon his chair. A big, coarse, strong-willed man with shiny eyes, a speech impediment, and numerous smallpox

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scars, Cartter announced the some of his delegation wished to switch their votes to Lincoln.  

Those delegates were Richard Corwine, R. K. Enos, John A. Curley, and Isaac Steese. The first two were friends of Lincoln. Enos calculated very rapidly that Lincoln was only two and a half votes shy of the nomination and urged Corwine to switch his vote. Corwine did so and persuaded Curley and Steese to follow suit. They then urged Cartter to announce their decision to support Lincoln.

Catching the attention of presiding officer George Ashmun, with whom Cartter had served in Congress, the Ohioan won recognition to speak and declared: “I rise (eh) Mr. Chairman (eh) to announce the change of four votes of Ohio from Mr. Chase to Mr. Lincoln.”

For a brief moment, stillness reigned. Most of the Illinois delegates were “so overcome with unexpected joy that they sat silently shedding tears.” David Davis “wept like a child.” Then the Wigwam erupted. The “Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio

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283 Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, 2:274-76; Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860; Howard K. Beale and Alan W. Brownsword, eds., Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson (3 vols.; New York, W.W. Norton, 1960), 2:359. James A. Briggs told a different version of this story: “I was sitting next to Mr. Joshua R. Giddings, and Mr. Lincoln was within four and a half votes of a nomination. I said to Mr. Giddings: ‘Tell Mr. Cartter to ask the Ohio delegates to change their votes to Abraham Lincoln, and let Ohio have the credit of the nomination.’ He did so.” Briggs to the editor of the Cleveland Leader, Brooklyn, 20 April 1887, clipping in the Briggs Scrapbooks, vol. 2, p. 177, Western Reserve Historical Society.


285 Interview with Cartter, Washington correspondence by Frank G. Carpenter, n.d., The Press, 14 August (no year indicated), clipping, Lincoln Museum, Fort Wayne; Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860; Chicago correspondence, 11 March 1895, by Newton Macmillan (interview with Joseph Medill), Chicago Tribune, 14 April 1895.


delegates seemed wild. They acted like madmen. One smashed his hat on another’s head, who returned the compliment, which was followed by a mutual embrace.” Lane of Indiana “teetered up and down on a chair, not saying a word, but grinning all over his expressive countenance, while he waved in a huge circumference a tile [high silk hat], damaged somewhat from its frequent contact with the head of a fellow delegate.”288 John A. Andrew reported hearing “a peal of human voices, a grand chorus of exultation, the like of which has not been heard on earth since the morning stars first sang together, and the sons of God shouted for joy.” Illinois delegates “leaped to the top of the benches on which they sat, and as by one motion of one man, hats were swung and thrown aloft in air, coats themselves streaming like banners in the breeze.” Their enthusiasm proved contagious, inspiring neighboring delegations from Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Connecticut to celebrate wildly. Soon “the whole Convention caught the impulse of the scene; and rolling on, rose wave upon wave, and wave upon wave, of wild tumultuous applause.” When the cheering ebbed, Andrew observed some old men with “quivering lips and streaming eyes, and hearts so full of joy they could not check their emotion” rise “in their seats to renew their cheers.”289 Atop the convention hall, a cannon repeatedly fired announcements of the result to the immense crowd outside, which issued a roar “like the breaking up of the fountains of the great deep.” It was so loud that the cannonade on the roof was inaudible to those in the building.290

Amid this pandemonium, Thurlow Weed pressed “his fingers hard upon his

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290 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
eyelids to keep back the tears.”²⁹¹ He was not alone; when “it became evident that Seward was to be sacrificed tears flowed like water among the vast throng.”²⁹² Several delegates from the Empire State “were so overcome by the defeat of their favorite that they cried like heart broken children.” Others “sat like marble statues.”²⁹³ Then William M. Evarts of New York, “with sorrow in his heart and tears in his eyes,” his “hands clenched nervously, and every nerve quivering with excitement,” mounted a table and graciously moved that the nomination be made unanimous. The motion was seconded by other Seward supporters.²⁹⁴ Orville Browning responded “with a rather dull speech” on behalf of the Lincolnites, thus ending the morning session. Delirious supporters of the Rail-splitter celebrated manically while Seward backers “were terribly stricken down,” Halstead reported. “They were mortified beyond all expression, and walked thoughtfully and silently away from the slaughter house, more ashamed than embittered. They acquiesced in the nomination, but did not pretend to be pleased with it.” It “was their funeral, and they would not make merry.”²⁹⁵

Some New York delegates sneered at Lincoln’s nomination, asking sourly: “What was it Webster said when Taylor was nominated?” (Daniel Webster had expressed scorn for the “illiterate frontier colonel,” whose 1848 nomination he thought unfit to be made.)²⁹⁶ Supporters of the Rail-splitter replied: “What was the result of the election?”²⁹⁷

²⁹³ Chicago correspondence by Simon Hanscom, 18 May, New York Herald, 19 May 1860.
²⁹⁴ Speech by Richard M. Blatchford at the ratification meeting in New York, 7 June, New York Herald, 8 June 1860; Chicago correspondence by Joseph Howard, 18 May, New York Times, 21 May 1860.
²⁹⁵ Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
When a Pennsylvania leader called on Thurlow Weed, he found Wizard of the Lobby “sullen, and offensive in both manner and expression. He refused even to talk about the contest, and intimated very broadly that Pennsylvania, having defeated Seward, must now elect Curtin and Lincoln” without the help of Sewardites. To Curtin, Weed said: “You have defeated the man who of all others was most revered by the people and wanted as President. You and Lane want to be elected, and to elect Lincoln you must elect yourselves.” Some New Yorkers, “mad as March hares,” swore “they would as soon go for Jeff Davis, Douglas, or any other minion of slavery, as for this third rate, rail splitting Lincoln.” At their headquarters, bets were made that the nominee would lose the Empire State by 20,000 votes. Some offered 50-to-1 odds that Douglas would be elected. Those delegates were almost afraid to return home, “fearing the wrath of the people.” As James W. Nye prepared to leave Chicago, he said “that he intended to travel nights and lie by by days until he reached home, as he felt too mortified and ashamed to be recognized.” A journalist reported that some “prominent workers against Seward, such as Greeley, [David] Dudley Field and [Anson] Burlingame, have been cursed most heartily. Nye and Burlingame came very near having a personal difficulty.” As soon as Lincoln won, Burlingame congratulated Field, exclaiming: “You have nominated Mr. Lincoln; now help us to nominate the ‘bobbin boy’ [N. P. Banks] for Vice-President!”

298 McClure, Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 41.
299 Curtin to A. K. McClure, 18 August 1891, ibid., 41n.
300 Chicago correspondence, 18 May, Missouri Republican (St. Louis), 19 May 1860; Carpenter, “How Lincoln Was Nominated,” 854; Fredrick W. Thayer to Stephen A. Douglas, Chicago, 18 May 1860, Douglas Papers, University of Chicago.
301 Detroit correspondence, 19 May, New York Herald, 20 May 1860.
Back in New York, some regarded Seward’s defeat as poetic justice. Referring to the Sage of Auburn and his operatives, Hamilton Fish remarked that just as “he & they served others, so have he & they have been served. The little seeds that have been sown along the path way of twenty five years of ambition & selfishness, have just come to maturity & have overwhelmed the sower.”

At the Tremont House, Lincoln’s operatives celebrated wildly. A journalist deemed them “the craziest men I ever saw. Their demonstrations were such as to defy competition from the inmates of any Lunatic Asylum. Screeches were made, embraces were exchanged, and songs were sung.” Halstead reported that “‘Old Abe’ men formed processions, and bore rails through the streets. Torrents of liquor were poured down the hoarse throats of the multitude.” From the hotel’s roof, one hundred rounds were fired.

A running mate for Lincoln had to be chosen that afternoon, but the delegates paid little attention to the matter, for “the confusion, surprise and disappointment which followed the nomination of Lincoln were so great that nobody appeared to know or care what became of the tail end of the ticket.” The convention selected the affable and portly Senator Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, a long-time opponent of slavery and close friend of Seward’s lieutenant, Senator Preston King, who would have been nominated himself if he had wanted that honor. Though as a former Democrat, Hamlin lent geographical as well as ideological balance to the ticket, it would have made more sense

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305 Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
306 Chicago correspondence, 30 May, New York Herald, 19 June 1860.
307 Henry J. Raymond’s dispatch, Auburn, 22 May, New York Times, 24 May 1860. King and Hamlin were so close that they resembled Siamese twins.
to nominate someone from the swing state of Pennsylvania, where the outcome of the
election was to be determined.\textsuperscript{308} To assuage the New Yorkers, they were offered the vice
presidency but “there was no man they were willing to nominate mean enough to accept
it, after the manner in which New York had been treated.” Still, they insisted on having
the power to name someone from another state. Cameron would have been an obvious
choice, but the Sewardites, resentful at his failure to support their man, “were determined
that Cameron . . . should not receive it.”\textsuperscript{309} To the Winnebago Chief, one of his delegates
explained: “You could have been nominated for Vice President but it would have cost a
fight & exposed you to the suspicion of having bargained for it with Mr. Lincoln’s
friends. They were prepared unanimously to present you but while we didn’t doubt our
ability to carry you on a fight we thought it would only weaken you & therefore said we
could only advise you to take it, upon a unanimous offer being made which New York
would not allow. You were pretty generally designated for Secretary of the Treasury, & it
seemed to be conceded you could claim & receive what you might desire.”\textsuperscript{310}

In addition to Cameron, the Seward people blackballed Andrew Reeder, John
Hickman, John M. Read, and all other Pennsylvanians. Also angry at Massachusetts and
Kentucky, Sewardites vetoed the candidacies of Cassius M. Clay, the crowd favorite, and
Nathaniel P. Banks.\textsuperscript{311} Seward, like his operatives, was spiteful and seized opportunities

\textsuperscript{308} Beale, ed., \textit{Bates Diary}, 130 (entry for 19 May 1860).
\textsuperscript{309} John Keyser paraphrased in the New York \textit{Times}, 24 May 1860 and in the New York \textit{Tribune}, 23 May
1860; McClure, \textit{Lincoln and Men of War-Times}, 40.
\textsuperscript{310} Samuel A. Purviance to Cameron, Pittsburgh, 23 May 1860, Cameron Papers, Dauphin County
\textsuperscript{311} J. Watson Webb to Seward, n.p., 25 February 1861, Seward Papers, University of Rochester; Ezra
Lincoln to Weed, Boston, 2 June 1860, Weed Papers, University of Rochester; Chicago correspondence, 18
May, New York \textit{Tribune}, 19 May 1860; Chicago correspondence by Samuel Bowles, 16 May, Springfield
(Massachusetts) \textit{Republican}, 19 May 1860; Chicago correspondence by Joseph Howard, 18 May, New
to punish foes.\textsuperscript{312} Earlier he had dangled the vice-presidency before Frank Blair in return for his family’s support, but the offer was spurned.\textsuperscript{313} The Maine delegates had lobbied hard for Hamlin, suggesting to the New Yorkers that if they had no candidate for the second slot, the Maine senator should be glad to have their support. Preston King agreed and successfully championed Hamlin’s cause.\textsuperscript{314}

Democrats ridiculed the swarthy Hamlin, alleging that “his blood is that of the Niggergee” and that he resembled “a free negro, more than any man living who claims to be a white man!”\textsuperscript{315} When he first entered the Maine legislature a decade earlier, he was known as “Negro Hamlin.”\textsuperscript{316} Some South Carolinians facetiously offered to purchase him.\textsuperscript{317} “A free nigger to preside in the United States Senate!” exclaimed an Alabamian. “How would Southern Senators like that? The humiliation and disgrace of the thing would certainly be something, but the smell would be awful.”\textsuperscript{318} In addition, Democrats

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item to Seward, Davenport, Iowa, 20 May 1860, Seward Papers, University of Rochester. The Cameron men also opposed Hickman and Read. Samuel A. Purviance to Cameron, Pittsburgh, 23 May 1860, Cameron Papers, Dauphin County Historical Society, Harrisburg. As a native of Kentucky, Clay was considered unsuitable because it “was thought inadvisable to have both candidates from the West.” Murat Halstead’s report in the Cincinnati Commercial, 21 May 1860.
\item This offer was made to Francis P. Blair, Sr. Montgomery Blair to Cassius M. Clay, Washington, 31 December 1881, Blair Family Papers, Library of Congress.
\item Hunt, Hannibal Hamlin, 116-18.
\item “We understand you have a very likely & intelligent mulatto boy you would dispose of on reasonable terms being engaged in negro trading if you will let us know what you will take for the boy Hanibal known as Hanibal Hamlin and your price is reasonable we will purchase him and are prepared to meet you with the cash at Richmond Va on the 18 Decr inst.” J. D. Wright, W. D. Hardy, and A. J. Hause to Lincoln, Spartanburg, S.C., 27 November 1860, Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.
\item Carrollton West Alabamian, 19 September 1860, quoted in Donald E. Reynolds, Editors Make War: Southern Newspapers in the Secession Crisis (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), 58.
\end{itemize}
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called Hamlin a homely, uncouth, “treacherous, creeping demagogue.”

Edward Lillie Pierce believed that Lincoln’s victory at Chicago would probably have occurred even if no bargains had been struck. Pierce argued that Lincoln “was nominated because his debates with Douglass and his Cooper Institute Speech showed him to be sound, and because he was the only candidate truly reliable who would not, like Seward and Chase, encounter conservative prejudices.” Another delegate, Carl Schurz of Wisconsin, concurred: “The historic fact is that, as the Convention would not take the risks involved in the nomination of Seward, it had no other alternative than to select Lincoln as the man who satisfied the demands of the earnest anti-slavery men without subjecting the party to the risks thought to be inseparable from the nomination of Seward.”

Joshua Giddings noted that “some of the dough-faces seemed to think him [Lincoln] more popular, because his anti-slavery sentiments had been less prominent.”

While it is doubtless true that the delegates made the smart, rational choice, political conventions are not always ruled by reason. Without the able leadership of Davis, Swett, and Judd, the support of their indefatigable assistants, the fortunate decision to hold the convention in Chicago, and the influence of the stentorian pro-Lincoln shouters, it is not unthinkable that Seward could have won the nomination.

REACTION IN SPRINGFIELD

319 Manchester, N. H., Union Democrat, 22 May 1860.
320 Pierce to Herndon, Milton, Massachusetts, 15 September 1889, Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants, 677.
When the news of Lincoln’s victory reached Springfield, the bearer of the dispatch rushed into the office of the Illinois State Journal, where the candidate and a large crowd has been following events, and proposed “three rousing cheers for Abraham Lincoln, the next President of the United States.” After the huzzahing, Lincoln took the dispatch, read it, accepted congratulations from all present, and said: “I must go home; there is a little short woman there that is more interested in this matter than I am.” En route, people stopped him on the street to offer congratulations. He thanked them and jestingly said: “you had better come and shake hands with me now that you have an opportunity – for you do not know what influence this nomination may have on me. I am human, you know.” He then returned home and remained there the rest of the day.323

Two years later, he “said that when he received the nomination he had forebodings as to the trouble which might ensue. This passed away for a resolution to abide the consequences, whatever they might be.”324

Springfield rocked with “with the wildest manifestations of joy,” as John Hay reported: “The Cerro Gordo cannon – El Cyclope – was dragged from its dignified repose in the State House, to rouse on alien prairies the echoes that once sounded over the chaparral of the south.” (When asked if cannons should fire one salute for each state or

323 Letter by a former employee of the editorial department of the Illinois State Journal (Springfield) to the editors of the Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), St. Louis, 20 May 1865, Missouri Democrat, n.d., copied in the Illinois State Journal (Springfield), 8 June 1865; Central Illinois Gazette, 23 May 1860; Charles S. Zane, statements for Herndon, [1865-66], Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants, 490-91; Zane, “Lincoln as I Knew Him,” 82-83; Ecelbarger, Great Comeback, 233-234. Other versions of the events of this memorable day, which seem less plausible than these, can be found in the reminiscences of T. W. S. Kidd, Illinois State Register (Springfield), 13 February 1903; an undated statement of George M. Brinkerhoff, Sr., in Weik, Real Lincoln, ed. Burlingame, 410-11; and Clinton L. Conkling, “How Mr. Lincoln Received the News of His First Nomination,” Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society 14 (1909): 63-66. Kidd denied the story that Lincoln was playing ball when he received word of his nomination. So too did Christopher C. Brown and James Gourley. Chicago Times-Herald, 25 August 1895; Wilson and Davis, eds., Herndon’s Informants, 437-38, 453.

100 salutes, Lincoln said: “I must begin my administration on the principle of retrenchment and economy. You had better fire but one gun for each state.”) Lincoln banners, “decked in every style of rude splendor, fluttered in the high west wind, and the very church bells signaled the triumph of stainless honor and pure conservatism by clangor that was un ecclesiastically merry.” In the evening “the town gathered in the rotunda of the capitol, and listened to the speeches of several gentleman who were kind enough to furnish a thread to hang shouts and cheers on; then proceeded with banners and music to the residence of the illustrious nominee,” who “appeared in his doorway, and in a few good-humored and dignified words” expressed his thanks “for their kind manifestations of regard. For a while the clear air trembled with their noisy joy, and then the hard-handed multitude rushed to grasp the hand that years ago was as hard as any there.”

Lincoln invited as many of the crowd as could fit into his modest home to join him and his wife. “We’ll give you a larger house on the fourth of next March!” shouted one of the revelers streaming across the threshold.

325 New York Times, 8 June 1860.
